

practised today date back to the sixteenth century, and art theory is more than a hundred years older yet. In its long history, art history has, to a greater or lesser extent, always been an interdisciplinary undertaking. This is not to say that all of art can be reduced to phenomena related to Intellectual History. Artistic style, and artistic choices, cannot be completely explained with reference to theories current at the time. None the less, even artistic style has been analyzed with reference to the intellectual and literary culture of its time, perhaps most successfully in the case of studies of sixteenth-century art. The inherent dangers of such undertakings are illustrated in Panofsky's profoundly problematic book on *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism*, in which he attempted to explain the formal characteristics of French Gothic cathedrals in terms of the mental patterns which he saw at work in contemporary scholasticism.

The branches of scholarship associated with Intellectual History, and of obvious use in the history of art, are too numerous and diversified to all be mentioned here. Only some examples will be given. Iconographic studies bring the scholar into contact with disciplines such as history of religion, political history, social history, the survival of the classics, and literary genres such as ekphrasis, and emblem theory.

Art theory was developed from the models of rhetoric and poetry; literary theory is therefore one of the main tools in studying the theory of art, complemented by textual criticism, the history of philosophy, and numerous disciplines which are crucial as much in the study of art as in the study of art theory and which will be mentioned below. The study of the history of art-theoretical terms, an obvious part of the study of art theory, may also be genuinely illuminating in defining the character of artworks of the same period.

The purpose of art can be addressed with notions derived from poetics and rhetoric or from philosophy; with theories of the functioning of symbols; with the tools provided by the theories of psychology and perception, and many others.

The understanding of art as imitation, based on an ancient theory and crucial in art theory from the fifteenth century onwards, led to the development of techniques of representation which are directly or indirectly based on developments in contemporary science. Thus, the history of science has an important place in art history; the history of medicine accounts for artists' anatomical knowledge; the history of mathematics

and applied mathematics provides the background for the development, and the more or less competent use, of linear perspective; colour theory, botany, and meteorology all attracted the attention of at least some artists, among whom Leonardo holds a place of prominence.

Questions of perception with regard to artworks were discussed already in the sixteenth century (in some instances following classical models), and were elaborated into sophisticated theories in the following centuries; the theory of perception remains a vital area of inquiry in art history today.

An important area of study is the transmission of knowledge to artists, their schooling, their training in the studio, the languages individual artists read, the books they owned, or had access to, and the uses they made of such books. Questions of education are similarly crucial with regard to the patrons who commissioned or collected works of art, and with regard to artistic advisers, who were in individual cases asked to devise the iconography of artworks. The history of book production is itself related to art history, since numerous books, both in manuscript and in print, were decorated by artists.

Lastly, the history of art history is obviously dependent on an interdisciplinary approach. Individual scholars' philosophical notions, their access to scholarly traditions, and their approaches to questions of methodology, document yet again the close links between many of the tasks art historians set themselves, and the disciplines associated with Intellectual History.

Intellectual Histories of Music?

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Since at present even the definition of music has become problematic, I may be forgiven for not being able to answer the question: What is the intellectual history of music? Musicology veers between an older generation of scholars who confidently answer the question: 'What is music?' by writing a monograph, and the admission of one the liveliest younger contributors to the field professing: 'I am no longer sure

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what MUSIC is.¹ I shall restrict myself to exploring some of the questions which at present clearly stir the minds of an increasing number of musicologists and sketch three research areas in which the discussion of such questions has already resulted in thought-provoking work without wishing to imply any negative criticism of authors and topics omitted.

1. The first area can be summarized under the question: 'Can we trust music?' It is generally assumed that we voluntarily suspend our disbelief when undergoing aesthetic experiences for the purpose of enjoyment and knowledge. But artists, or at least writers involved with the arts have again and again voiced their concern about the object of this 'disbelief'. According to Hans Blumenberg, the tradition of aesthetic theory can be placed under the umbrella of a historically continuous discussion along the lines of the ancient theme that poets are liars.² Confirmation of a conflict between the invention and disclosure of reality in aesthetic experience comes, to quote one example from Rousseau, when he admonished composers of operas to bear in mind their audiences' fluctuating feelings: 'On doit songer qu'on parle à des cœurs sensibles sans oublier qu'on parle à des gens raisonnables.'³

This raises the questions: 'Which part of reason remains active, when we gain pleasure by suspending our disbelief?' and 'How does intellectual activity relate to the work of art we are experiencing?' Carolyn Abbate has queried the traditional perception of vocal music as simply 'analogous to the event-sequences of theatrical or cinematic narrative'.⁴ Such an approach, she claims, treats music as tautological, as part of a monolithic block, which we either reject or

¹ Carl Dahlhaus and Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht, *Was ist Musik?* (Wilhelmshaven, 1985); Susan McClary, *Feminine Endings: Music, Gender and Sexuality* (Minnesota, 1991), 19.

² H. Blumenberg, 'Wirklichkeitsbegriff und Möglichkeit des Romans', *Nachmahnung und Illusion*, ed. H. R. Jauss (Munich, 1969), 9.

³ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'Opéra', *Dictionnaire de Musique, OC*, ed. B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond (Paris, 1995), v: 957.

⁴ Carolyn Abbate, *Unsung Voices* (Princeton, 1991), p. x.

accept, or only understand in a reductionist manner. She criticizes various musicologists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, who in operatic studies postulated a congruence between text, music, and stage scenery, while they tended to interpret instrumental music on the basis of only one parameter. These methods, she rightfully claims, cannot sufficiently take into account any of the 'cross-currents' and 'multi-layers', which are easily detected in musical structures and all too familiar from both literature and literary studies. But what is a 'cross-current' in a musical composition? and how can it be analysed? Abbate focuses mainly on musical narratives, that is, such moments in a drama when action is interrupted and a protagonist can give his or her view of a past or future event. At this point, the composer has the opportunity to shade the account musically in innumerable ways. He may contradict the voice of the singer, or reveal to the audience through music something the protagonist does not know, and so on. A moral question arises as the composer and, in the second place, the listener has to decide whether a singer rings true or false: 'When narration is allied to music, sensing truth demands doubly acute ears.'⁵ Applying French literary theory, in particular Roland Barthes, to music, Abbate analyses music by Délibes, Dukas, Mozart, Wagner, Mahler, and more recently Richard Strauss as a multivalent structure.⁶

Through her brilliant textual and musical interpretation Abbate makes the reader aware of the many different forms of narrative, from the personal rendering of a story to pure vocalizing without text, as in Lakmé's introductory coloratura from Délibes' opera. She focuses on scenes like this because musical sound here acquires a relative independence from the plot as the voice assails the listener simply by its physical force. Simultaneously, the audience becomes 'aware . . . —painfully, if the high C is missed—that we witness a performance'.⁷ However Jauss's criticism of French structuralist literary theory applies to Abbate: 'The texts remain, as it were, among themselves, separated from their genesis and consequence.'⁸

⁵ *Ibid.*, 156.

⁶ See also Carolyn Abbate, 'Opera, or the Envoicing of Women', in Ruth Solie (ed.), *Musicology and Difference: Gender and Sexuality in Music Scholarship* (Berkeley, 1993), 225–58.

⁷ Abbate, *Unsung Voices*, 10.

⁸ H. R. Jauss, *Ästhetische Erfahrung und literarische Hermeneutik* (Frankfurt, 1982), 68.

2. The second area can be summarized under the question: 'How can we evaluate historical forms of musical theory and practice when they are alien to our modern culture?' Gary Tomlinson's book *Music in Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others* immediately indicates through its title and subtitle that he, too, is concerned with the historiography of music, but also makes clear that much more is at stake than in Abbate's *Unsung Voices*. Tomlinson criticizes previous Renaissance music historians for concentrating on issues of style and genre at the expense of the investigation the 'hidden premises of past ways of knowing and doing'.⁹ Taking his cues from Foucault's archaeology and the self-criticism of anthropologists (Geertz), Tomlinson revokes the purification of sixteenth-century musical culture tacitly undertaken by previous scholars, describing instead sixteenth-century magical thinking in connection with its musical practice as an endeavour to create magical effects. Tomlinson deserves the highest praise for raising the problem as to how the modern reader can evaluate such alien activities most prominently described in Ficino. However, his conclusion is disconcerting. 'It is not enough to grant that Ficino's musical magic was rhetorically successful as social practice, performance or speech act. Ficino himself clearly placed it also in something like what we today would call a sphere of "techne"; in order not to violate his world construction we must accept it as operating technically as well as socially . . . Our desire to ask is, however, almost irresistible: "But how, precisely, did Ficino's songs work technically?" . . . We must recognise that the voicing itself of the question is an unwarranted act of translation, a forced reshaping of Ficino's world to fit the different shape of our own . . . So we must not ask the question that comes automatically to our lips.'¹⁰

Despite his sophisticated account of the recent debate on 'dialogue' (Gadamer, Ricoeur, Bakhtin), Tomlinson does not in fact carry out such a dialogue with this alien form of thinking but simply enthrones it as a social reality, forbidding his readers any doubts about its status, although this in particular has been contested since the seventeenth century. In a review article Karol Berger is rightly alarmed about the possible political consequences that might fol-

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low from Tomlinson's intellectual attitude: 'What he [Tomlinson] wants is to establish a permanent protected zone, a barrier beyond which we are not allowed to peek. He erects this barrier out of a well-meaning though distinctly condescending and paternalistic wish to protect the vulnerable other from our hegemonic advances and forgets that historically and in our bloody century more than ever, barriers of this kind protected all sorts of others, not only the weak and good, but equally the strong and wicked.'¹¹

3. The third area of research to be sketched concerns a growing group of scholars debating the political implications of music criticism in their attempts to continue the Critical Theory of Theodor W. Adorno. Rose Subotnik, a pioneer in American musicological studies of Adorno,¹² espouses for example Adorno's view that there was an ideal moment in music history at the end of the eighteenth century when the artistic interests of composers and society coincided, to interpret the 'raw' sound of Papageno's flute in Mozart's *The Magic Flute* as a metaphor of the ideal of 'social inclusiveness'.¹³ The moments of unaccompanied sound and the manner of their incorporation into the opera provide Subotnik with the musical element for her philosophical interpretation, which is concerned with the validity of historical ideas in modern society. Subotnik's close reading of sources in her earlier articles has

¹¹ Karol Berger, 'Contemplating Music Archaeology', *Journal of Musicology*, 13 (1995): 127.

¹² See Rose R. Subotnik, *Developing Variations. Style and Ideology in Western Music* (Minnesota, 1991). See also Susan McClary, 'A Musical Dialectic from the Enlightenment: Mozart's "Piano Concerto in G Major, K. 453", Movement 2', *Cultural Critique*, 4 (1986): 129-69; M. Paddison, *Adorno's Aesthetic of Music* (Cambridge, 1993); M. Paddison, *Adorno's Modernism and Mass Culture: Essays on Critical Theory and Music* (1996).

¹³ Rose Subotnik, 'Whose Magic Flute?', in *Deconstructive Variations: Music and Reason in Western Society* (Minnesota, 1996), 33.

⁹ Gary Tomlinson, *Music in Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others* (Chicago, 1993), p. xi.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 250-51.

been developed more recently into a critical stance which she adopts towards Adorno's and Schoenberg's ideal of the reclusive, score-possessing, structural listener. This listener's approach to music is revealed not only as being based on a particular musical style and education, but also as lacking 'recognition to non-structural varieties of meaning or emotion in the act of listening. . . . Structural listening by itself turns out to be socially divisive.'¹⁴

This social divisiveness as enacted through music must not be of major concern given the status of music in modern society. It shows itself not only in the dimming lights at the beginning of most concerts, when we retreat into our emotional self to prepare ourselves for the passive 'concert occasion',¹⁵ but also in the difficulty we have in talking about the aesthetic experience of an ever increasing number of musics without losing our identity.

Intellectual History and the History of Philosophy

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Recently, the relation of intellectual history to the history of philosophy seems to be an American concern. I can give two examples. Ten years ago, Richard Rorty wanted the history of philosophy to be written as an intellectual history.¹ Six years ago, Donald Kelley reminded us that intellectual history was nothing more than an offspring of the history of philosophy and that it was never very distant from it.² Rorty argues as a philosopher. He speaks of histories of philosophy written by philosophers who tend to think that philosophy 'owns' its

¹⁴ 'Toward a Deconstruction of Structural Listening: a Critique of Schoenberg, Adorno and Stravinsky', in *Deconstructive Variations*, 170.

¹⁵ Edward Said, *Musical Elaborations* (London, 1991), 11.

¹ 'The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres', in *Philosophy in History*, ed. R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 49-75.

² 'What is Happening to the History of Ideas?', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 51 (1990): 3-25 (reprinted in this issue, pp. 36-50).

proper history. Their histories should be abandoned, says Rorty, since we have enough doxographies or 'histories of the peaks'. Rather, we should write 'nitty-gritty' intellectual histories of philosophy and try to see past philosophies within the context of what they meant to their contemporaries. In this view, philosophers are not merely 'holding' opinions, they are not merely theoreticians, system-builders, or writers, but most of all thinkers who must be understood in the intellectual context of their time and place. Rorty urges us to let go any form of mirroring: the history of philosophy should not look back into past and forgotten ideas, but it should give a historico-critical reconstruction of the intellectual dimension of philosophy.

When Rorty says that the history of philosophy is different from intellectual history, Kelley does not disagree. But he emphasizes the fact that the history of philosophy is always needed for whatever form of intellectual history, because what is central to it, namely intellectual or 'spiritual' life, is everywhere implicitly 'loaded' with philosophy. Being an intellectual historian himself, Kelley hints at the fact that historians of philosophy have been around long before intellectual historians, and that they were the first to give comprehensive descriptions of ideas and notions, of conceptions and world views. In this more historical perspective, intellectual history will always overlap with the history of philosophy: be it only because their interests were originally linked.

Not everybody may think today this overlapping of intellectual history and the history of philosophy still pertinent. And of course it can be argued that even if philosophy was taken in a very wide sense as to embrace all the arts and sciences, it could never really demarcate the open fields of intellectual history. The point is, however, that any interest in intellectual history develops from some disciplinary perspective, e.g. from a philosophical perspective, and that, consequently, it must overcome this perspective in order to include it into the much wider scope—however vague—of intellectual history. In any case, intellectual history should never match any history of any discipline, not even that of philosophy. It should be interdisciplinary and international, holistic and comparative at the same time.

What we can learn from Kelley and Rorty and their demand to change the history of philosophy into an intellectual history, is implicitly enclosed in that demand: it is the fact that the narrowing of the historical perspective takes