



INTELLECTUAL NEWS

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NEWSLETTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR INTELLECTUAL HISTORY





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The First *Intellectual News* Competition

A free year's membership will be awarded to the first member who correctly identifies all the intellectuals pictured on the cover of this issue. Write or e-mail the Editor, Constance Blackwell, at the address above. The pictures, which will be identified in our next issue, are reproduced by permission of the British Library.



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EDITOR'S LETTER

The Inaugural Issue

Constance Blackwell

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The proposal for an INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR INTELLECTUAL HISTORY was first made at an inaugural meeting on the weekend of 8–9 July 1994. Thirty-two scholars from the disciplines of History of the Book, History of Literature, Religious History, Political Thought, Art and Music History, History of Philosophy, and History of Science gathered to discuss whether there might be support for such an international organization and how it might aid research in their disciplines. The meeting began at dinner in the garden of 28 Gloucester Crescent, London, on a beautiful summer evening where participants were asked to begin to think about their next day's contributions of seven minutes, in which they would describe their field and the extent to which it might be part of what might be called 'Intellectual History'. These speeches were given when the meeting convened with the hospitality of Professor Villari of the Italian Cultural Institute in Belgrave Square. We have included here nineteen of the texts, which we hope will give a good idea of the varieties of interests, as well as the enthusiasm of the participants.

To date we have had an excellent response from our first notices with interest from around the world: Albania, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, the Irish Republic, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Morocco, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Turkey, and the USA.

A question has been raised by members about national affiliations; this will be discussed at our meeting in Berlin in 1998. For example, there is already a growing Intellectual History Society in Spain, and we hope to include a report on it in the next issue of *Intellectual News*.

In sum, we welcome the idea but are not yet certain what the correct structure should be; we think this should be discussed more generally. A constitution will not be adopted until 1999 in order to allow us to see how the Society is developing.

The organization of the inaugural planning meeting would have been impossible without the co-operation of Nancy Streuver of the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, past president of the International Society for the History of Rhetoric, who attended this meeting as well as the first meeting of the Standing Committee, giving invaluable advice. The other principal organizer was Ulrich Johannes Schneider of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Leipzig, and we were greatly aided by Marta Fattori of the *Lessico Intellettuale Europeo* and La Sapienza in Rome. We also received full support from Donald Kelley of the *Journal of the History of Ideas* and Rutgers University, who has been a supporter of the idea of such a Society from the start and at whose seminar (with the Foundation for Intellectual History) on 'History and the Disciplines' at the Folger Shakespeare Library, Washington, D.C., the notion was first discussed. We include here Professor Kelley's essay from the *JHI* (pp. 36–50), since many of our contributions refer to it, and we fear many of our members may find it difficult to locate. We are grateful for permission to reprint the article.

Several cardinal points were decided at the inaugural meeting: (1) There will be no attempt to define 'intellectual history' as having only one approach. Professor Kelley's article is meant only as a point of reference, and a careful reader of the following essays will notice that several writers disagree with one another on certain approaches. (2) The Society will be run by a Standing Committee. (3) The Standing Committee will be co-ordinated by Constance Blackwell, who will organize the membership drive and edit this newsletter, *Intellectual News*, for the first five years. It is hoped that others will be willing to help and share the burden as time goes on. The Foundation for Intellectual

There will be no attempt to define 'intellectual history' as having only one approach.

History will supply some money for the start-up costs for the initial time period, but the aim is to have 600 or more paying members by the year 2000, who can support *Intellectual News* and supply administrative costs for conferences.

The members of the Standing Committee are: Ann Blair (Harvard), Constance Blackwell (Foundation for Intellectual History, London), Donald Kelley (Rutgers), Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann (Berlin), Ulrich Johannes Schneider (Leipzig), Edoardo Tortarolo (Turin), Françoise Waquet (CNRS, Paris), Charles Webster (Oxford). The Committee has met three times to date: London, January 1995; Paris, August 1995; Göttingen, June 1996.

Conferences

The Standing Committee has decided to begin with a small meeting in co-operation with the *Journal of the History of Ideas* at Rutgers in 1997, on the topic of 'The Idea of Tradition'. Our first large meeting is to be held in Berlin in June 1998 and will cover 'The History of Endings'; it will be run by Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann. There will be another large conference in Cambridge, England in July 1999, to be organized by Françoise Waquet and Edoardo Tortarolo, on 'Great Intellectual Quarrels'. This issue of *Intellectual News* includes the announcement of the Berlin meeting (pp. 50–51).

Intellectual News

Initially there will be two issues of *Intellectual News* each year, one in the autumn with essays by members and one in the spring devoted to news and publication announcements of members. We thank all our members for their support and for the full information they have supplied in applications for membership in the Society. We look forward to further contributions and news from all of you. All contributions must be sent to Constance Blackwell in time to be received by 1 March (if intended for the News issue) or 1 June (for the Essay issue). Please double-space the typescript to leave room for copy-editing, and if possible enclose a file on floppy disk in addition to hard copy.

For the News issue we shall supply space free of charge to all *paid-up* members for announce-

ment of all books and articles published by members, and we also offer space of up to 3,000 words for reports on important conferences or the initiation of seminars that might be classified as intellectual history. As long as we have space, in order that the bibliography of members' works should be more informative than a mere list, we wish to print an abstract of 50–100 words indicating the contents of each item listed. We shall also announce those activities of other learned societies that may be of interest to our members, as well as scholarships or research awards that are available to members.

For the Essay issue we welcome essays of 3,000–4,000 words in English, French, German, Italian, or Spanish in any of the following areas: (1) Book reviews on classics of intellectual history from any time period. (2) Short histories of journals or publishing series that have contributed to intellectual history from the seventeenth century to the present. (3) Essays on the history of national or private institutions that have contributed to research on intellectual history or by their presence made intellectual history. (4) Essays on current books or research projects. These essays should deal with the intellectual issues addressed in the work in question or, in the case of editions of letters, what new information was revealed by the collection or ordering of the material. (5) We very much welcome national reports from scholars who find themselves rethinking the intellectual traditions of their countries. We have received interesting comments from members in Albania and South Africa, to name but two; Professor Urbánek's essay in this issue (pp. 19–21) may serve as a model for the presentation of such matter. (6) The topic of our first small meeting, 'The Idea of Tradition' (see above) has interested many members, and we regret that the meeting had necessarily to be kept small. Nevertheless, we welcome essays on the topic for *Intellectual News*, as well as notices of articles already published on the topic.

Internet

At the time of printing we do not yet have a site on the World Wide Web, but we hope to have established one by the time of the News issue next spring. Any member with experience with Web sites, who has ideas on how one might best be constructed for discussion and the presentation of information, is encouraged to contact Constance Blackwell by e-mail: cblackwell@binthist.demon.co.uk.

Membership

All membership will date from December 1996. Those who have paid to date will see their current membership extending until December 1997 (at which time you will need to renew it). We thank all early members for their support. Payment should be sent to Constance Blackwell by VISA or a cheque in British pounds. Cash is not a secure option, but we are aware that for some this is the only possible method of payment, and we shall acknowledge receipt of such payments in writing. Members in the US dollar area should send checks in dollars only to

Gordon Schochet, the membership secretary for the Americas.

Acknowledgements

A major collaborator for our publication planning is Jeffrey Dean, who has helped not only with design and typesetting but also with long-term publication plans for the Society. Our Assistant Editor is Jane Roper of King's College, London, who both helps with copy-editing and is responsible for keeping the membership lists and addresses up to date. Ulrich Schneider has offered good advice at all stages of our project.

INTELLECTUAL HISTORY AND THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK

Intellectual History and the History of the Book

Iain R. Willison
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1. *The Present State of the History of the Book as a Field of Study*

The present phase in the development of the study of the history of the book is characterized by the attempt to integrate traditional, mainly antiquarian and inward-looking book-history with general media and cultural history. This phase was opened by the appearance in 1958 of Lucien Febvre's long-awaited *L'Apparition du Livre*, which was in fact largely written by one of Febvre's last main disciples (Febvre dying shortly afterwards), Henri-Jean Martin. Indeed it was Martin who became, and has remained, *le grand patron* of the field of study.

The bulk of the scholarly work in the field is in three major modes. First, we have large-scale, pioneering surveys and monographs such as (of particular interest to intellectual historians) Elizabeth Eisenstein's *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early Modern Europe* (1979), Robert Darnton's *The Business of En-*

lightenment: A Publishing History of the Encyclopédie, 1775-1800,¹ or David McKitterick's histories of the Cambridge University Library and University Press.² Then we have a number of multi-volume, national projects for Europe and the English-speaking world in progress, led by the French *Histoire de l'édition française*, (1982-6) edited by H.-J. Martin and Roger Chartier) and the *Histoire des bibliothèques françaises* (1988-92) followed by the Cambridge *History of the Book in Britain* (edited by D. F. McKitterick, McKenzie, and myself), the *Geschichte des deutschen Buchhandels* (a continuation from 1870 of the original Kapp-Goldfriedrich volumes), the *History of the Book in America* (general editor David Hall), and comparable projects for Australia, New Zealand, Scotland, Ireland, and Canada. (Though these massive projects are largely concerned with technical book history, their introductory chapters will—at least in the British case—draw out the implications for general cultural and intellectual history, of what Febvre and Martin called 'le livre, ce ferment'). Thirdly, we have contributions to revisionist analyses of the classic phases of cultural and intellectual history such as, for the Renaissance,

¹ 2 vols. (Cambridge University Press, 1979).

² *Cambridge University Library, a History: the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, (Cambridge University Press, 1986); *A History of Cambridge University Press, Vol. 1, Printing and the Book Trade, 1534-1688* (Cambridge University Press, 1992).

We still have some way to go in finally establishing the theory and practice of the interconnection of the history of the book and intellectual history.

Le Livre dans l'Europe de la Renaissance (1988; edited by Martin and others), *New Perspectives on Renaissance Thought* (1990; edited by John Henry and Sarah Hutton), and *Die Renaissance im Licht der Nationen Europas* (1991; edited by Georg Kauffmann), which include chapters on the book trade by Ian Maclean of Oxford.

At this point I must mention a vitally important addition to the whole infrastructure supporting the study of the history of the book (and indeed intellectual history itself): machine-readable databases which allow unprecedentedly sophisticated access to the appropriate printed catalogues, starting with the *Eighteenth-Century English Short-Title Catalogue* (1976 onwards) and the collateral *North American Imprints Program*, which led to the European *Incunabula Short-Title Catalogue*. Now, with the creation of the Consortium of European Research Libraries, there is a database for the whole European hand-press book archive up to the nineteenth century.

2. *The Interconnection of the History of the Book and Intellectual History*

I have already mentioned the work of Eisenstein, Darnton, McKitterick, and Maclean as examples of this interconnection; and I should now refer to two programmatic statements of the contextual contribution of the history of the book as artifact to intellectual history. One by Darnton in 1980, entitled 'Intellectual and Cultural History', which appeared in Michael Kammen's American Historical Association collection of essays, *The Past before Us* (1980). Here Darnton suggests that 'the printed word provides one trail', where 'by following it the historian can get some sense of the lived experience of literature'.³ The other by Roger Chartier, entitled 'Intellectual History or Socio-cultural History? The French Trajectories', which appeared in Dominic LaCapra and Steven L. Kaplan's collection *Modern European Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New Per-*

spectives (1982). Here Chartier points out that *l'histoire du livre*, and the related disciplines dealing with *mentalité*, 'incite us to situate all texts in the reading relationships that are entangled with them'. More recently Darnton has proposed that we conceive the world of the book and its history as 'a cultural system' interacting with other cultural systems.⁴

However, we still have some way to go in finally establishing the theory and practice of the interconnection of the history of the book and intellectual history. At the level of grand theory I have had occasion to point out the 'bibliographical innocence' of both Michel Foucault, who (though an habitué of the Bibliothèque Nationale) felt the materiality of the embodiment of a statement to be 'not important enough to alter the identity of the statement',⁵ and Sir Karl Popper, who likewise felt that although the world of objective knowledge was constituted by 'the logical contents of books, libraries . . . and such like', nevertheless 'of course the physical shape of the book is insignificant'.⁶ But in practice we are now well on our way. In the subordinate but, from the point of view of intellectual history, central field of the history of scholarship, we have the exemplary work of Anthony Grafton employing the evidence of the marginalia in surviving copies of books used by scholars as an essential part of his major programme of re-presenting 'the traditions of scholarship in an age of science' in the early modern world (*Defenders of the Text*, 1991). There is a new interest in the old discipline of *historia literaria* as a focus for correlating work on the history of books, libraries, and scholarship. In the wider, more established field of the history of ideas we have contextualist projects such as the Cambridge series *Ideas in Context* and its programme of presenting 'a new picture . . . of the development of ideas in their concrete contexts' by detailed studies of 'their modification by different audiences. By this means, artificial distinctions between the history of philosophy, of the various sciences, of society and politics, and of literature, may be seen to dissolve'. To this programme Ian Maclean's *Interpretation and Meaning in the Renaissance: The Case of Law* (1992) is a likewise exemplary contribution.

⁴ *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 14.VII.1993.

⁵ *Archéologie du Savoir* (1969), 161.

⁶ *Objective Knowledge* (1979), 73-4; 'Autobiography' in *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, ed. Schilpp (1974), II: 143.

3. *The History of the Book Network: Newsletters and Institutions*

With the steady professionalizing of the history of the book since the 1950s a network has been growing rapidly. The predominant mode so far has been the newsletter, complemented by an annual meeting (and now, list-servers on the Internet) for which, in the English-speaking world, a mildly formal association of subscriber/members has usually been created. Thus, in Britain we have the Book Trade History Group and its newsletter, and internationally, the Society for the History of Authorship, Reading, and Publishing (SHARP, which invites members from any country). In Europe, on the other hand, we have *In Octavo*, a newsletter compiled and distributed free—to any applicant, anywhere in the world—from the Institut Mémoires de l'Édition Contemporaine in Paris, supported by the Max-Planck-Institut in Göttingen, both of which—as institutes—are able to use the formal seminar rather than the annual meeting as the complementary focus. (Both *In Octavo* and the *SHARP Newsletter* include items on a world-wide basis.)

Indeed, with the steady professionalizing of our field of study, interdisciplinary post-graduate institutes and seminars are growing in number, particularly in the English-speaking world. There are Centers for the History of the Book at Pennsylvania State University, the University of Wisconsin at Madison, Monash University Victoria, the University of Toronto, and elsewhere. Finally, the new School of Advanced Studies in the University of London is promoting a Master of Arts 'taught course' as part of the School's strategy to prepare the manpower necessary for advanced interdisciplinary studies in the humanities, not only in London but also, given suitable protocols of collaboration, nationally and internationally.

Histoire des relations intellectuelles dans la République des Lettres

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(France)

Les travaux que j'ai menés sur les relations entre les savants français et italiens aux XVII^e et

L'histoire intellectuelle, si elle fait une juste part aux grands noms et aux grandes œuvres de la pensée, ne se limite pas à ces quelques «phares». Elle inclut non seulement des auteurs de deuxième et troisième ordre, mais encore un public de gens cultivés.

XVIII^e siècles, les recherches que je poursuis sur la République des Lettres m'ont conduite à définir un certain nombre d'axes de recherche, à poser un certain nombre de questions qui s'inscrivent dans le cadre général de l'histoire intellectuelle. C'est donc à partir de cette expérience personnelle et éminemment subjective que je vais tenter de définir *a posteriori* ce qu'est l'histoire intellectuelle.

C'est d'abord une histoire complexe qui lie de façon indissociable l'histoire des idées et l'histoire des cadres et des formes de la vie intellectuelle. Je crois, en effet, que non seulement les unes et les autres ne peuvent être étudiées séparément, mais que, de surcroît, il faut tenir compte de l'interaction qui existe entre le mouvement des idées et leurs vecteurs au sens le plus large du terme. Par ailleurs, une telle histoire ne doit point s'arrêter au monde de la pensée pure, au jeu des idées désincarnées. Les «savants», pour employer le terme alors en vigueur, furent aussi des hommes pris dans le contexte politique, social et religieux de leur temps, contexte dont on ne saurait les abstraire ; les jugements qu'ils portèrent dans l'ordre intellectuel participent, en fait, de réalités plus amples qu'il convient de reconstruire.

L'histoire intellectuelle, si elle fait une juste part aux grands noms et aux grandes œuvres de la pensée, ne se limite pas, pour moi, à ces quelques «phares». Elle inclut non seulement des auteurs de deuxième et troisième ordre, mais encore un public de gens cultivés. Et ce pour deux raisons principales. D'une part, l'œuvre d'auteurs secondaires permet de suivre la pénétration des idées et les évolutions complexes qu'elles subissent dans leur diffusion. D'autre part, la réalité d'un public cultivé ne doit pas être ignorée : les auteurs en tenaient compte et les exemples ne manquent pas des interactions qui existent entre l'auteur et son lecteur.

L'histoire intellectuelle doit se garder de l'abstraction non seulement en tenant compte des hommes «concrets» qui la firent, mais

encore en prenant conscience des différences cachées qui existent entre eux. Et ici les leçons des anthropologues ont été, pour moi, extrêmement précieuses. Les historiens, en effet, et en particulier ceux qui ont traité des relations interculturelles dans le cadre de l'Europe moderne ont généralement considéré — implicitement le plus souvent — comme fondamentalement identiques les gens auxquels ils consacraient leurs travaux. L'idée d'une République des Lettres où les particularismes nationaux se seraient effacés devant une citoyenneté supérieure a gommé, si besoin était, les ultimes disparités. De sorte que si les historiens ont bien noté des différences quant à la culture consciente, manifeste, explicite des populations qu'ils étudiaient, ils ont postulé qu'au fond tous ces gens étaient bien pareils. Or, traiter ainsi de façon indifférenciée des hommes appartenant à des cultures différentes, c'est ignorer ou négliger cet ensemble de règles de pensée et de comportement qui se situent pour ainsi dire « au-delà de la culture » (E. Hall, *Beyond Culture*), autant de composantes qu'il serait fallacieux de croire communes à toutes les cultures. Ainsi, la reconstruction de la perception de l'espace et du temps chez les élites françaises et italiennes des XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles m'a permis de mesurer l'écart qui séparait les deux « communautés », l'écart qui, d'emblée, conditionnait le jeu des forces en présence et donc la relation intellectuelle.

L'histoire intellectuelle s'inscrit nécessairement, selon moi, dans la longue durée. Les phénomènes intellectuels ont toujours une préhistoire et ils ne peuvent donc être pleinement intelligibles sans tenir compte d'évolutions historiques complexes. Il ne s'agit point ici, je le précise, d'opérer une coupe à la veille de la période considérée, mais de s'enfoncer dans le passé à la recherche des éléments les plus divers qui, dans leurs combinaisons, ont contribué à faire que la situation est telle et non telle.

Dans cet essai de reconstruction du passé, l'histoire intellectuelle doit être attentive, comme d'ailleurs toute forme d'histoire, à éviter l'anachronisme. Ici, je ne peux que dire ma fidélité à la leçon méthodologique que Lucien Febvre énonça dans son ouvrage *Le problème de l'incroyance au XVI^e siècle : la religion de Rabelais* (éd. revue 1962) et dans son recueil d'articles *Combats pour l'histoire* (1953). Je me suis toujours efforcée (avec quel succès ?) d'éviter de projeter sur les textes du passé les catégories, les notions, la terminologie qui sont les nôtres, et j'ai fait en sorte de poser à leurs auteurs des questions qui leur fussent intelligibles et aux-

quelles ils puissent répondre. Autrement dit, et pour prendre un exemple, il ne s'est pas agi pour moi de savoir quel son le *Polyhistor* de Morhof rendait à mes oreilles et de porter un jugement sur cet ouvrage, mais de retrouver les analyses qui déterminèrent Morhof à écrire cet ouvrage et à lui donner la forme qu'il lui donna. Une telle démarche implique de prendre en compte ce que Febvre appela « outillage mental », c'est-à-dire l'ensemble, voire les ensembles, d'instruments conceptuels qui existent à une époque donnée ; elle amène également à considérer au-delà des moyens, des réalisations et des forces, les jugements, les opinions, les sentiments des contemporains. En ce sens, l'histoire intellectuelle est l'histoire de la subjectivité des « intellectuels ».

Bien des éléments dans les développements précédents laissent entendre que l'histoire intellectuelle ne peut être qu'internationale ou, du moins, supra-nationale. Les idées ne s'arrêtent pas aux frontières des États ; il n'est que de parcourir, pour prendre un exemple simple, les périodiques savants. Cette dimension internationale ressort encore de la biographie de bien des savants : que de carrières se dessinèrent sous le signe de la mobilité (qu'elle fut voulue ou forcée). Elle caractérise également nombre de formes d'association du monde savant, qu'il s'agisse des organisations publiques et institutionnelles (telles les universités ou les académies) aussi bien que privées et informelles (le Cabinet Dupuy ou les boutiques des libraires parisiens furent, sur des modes divers, des lieux de rencontres internationaux). Enfin, pour faire court, je voudrais souligner le poids qu'eut alors l'idéologie de la République des Lettres ; je ne m'attarderai pas ici sur la réalité de cette construction intellectuelle ; je me bornerai à souligner l'incidence qu'eut, et souvent en dépit de la dure réalité des faits, l'idée d'une communauté savante dépassant les frontières politiques et religieuses ; ce grand rêve jamais réalisé mais toujours réalisable conféra au monde de l'esprit, à un moment particulier de son histoire, une force, une cohésion et une unité jusqu'alors inconnues.

L'une des voies d'approche de l'histoire intellectuelle saisie dans sa dimension internationale consisterait en une recherche systématique sur les formes de la sociabilité savante dans l'Europe des XVI^e–XVIII^e siècles. Il s'agirait de recenser et d'étudier non seulement les formes d'association institutionnelles et durables (comme les universités et les académies), des organisations informelles (cercles, conversa-

tions), mais encore des réseaux personnels (à travers des correspondances et des voyages, par exemple), ou des liens plus épisodiques (tels ceux qui se créèrent à l'occasion d'une souscription). Dans cette même perspective, les recueils, les biographies collectives, les périodiques (notamment par le biais de la collecte de l'information) seraient l'objet d'enquêtes, ainsi que certaines pratiques de recherche (tels les réseaux mis en place par les astronomes pour leurs observations). On s'intéresserait également aux dédicaces, aux préfaces et à ces liminaires, tels les poèmes et autres pièces écrits en l'honneur de l'auteur par ses amis, autant de documents qui constituent un excellent moyen — et parfois, le seul — pour étudier le lien social dans les milieux intellectuels. Une telle recherche permettrait, à mon sens, de mieux saisir la réalité de la circulation des idées et, au delà, la dynamique même du monde savant à l'époque moderne. Elle amènerait, entre autres, à souligner la part d'une dimension orale dans les échanges intellectuels : en dépit du triomphe de la civilisation de l'imprimé, l'oralité conserva une place non négligeable, place que l'historiographie n'a pas encore saisie dans sa véritable dimension, qu'il s'agisse de la leçon universitaire, de la lecture académique ou de la conversation entre doctes. Cette recherche permettrait également de saisir le rapport dialectique qui exista entre culture savante et culture mondaine. L'historiographie — et je pense ici au cas particulier de la France — a opposé les deux formes de culture ; or, les textes mêmes permettent de saisir leurs liens réciproques, voire l'osmose qui se produisit entre elles : je pense, par exemple, aux Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes de Fontenelle ; et comment comprendre plainement les Philosophes et les Lumières sans les salons ?

Topics in the History of Scholarship

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I have selected two topics in the history of scholarship as possible conference subjects. They are connected with a seminar I am running at the Warburg Institute on the history of scholarship c.1550–c.1750.

L'historiographie a opposé la culture savante et la culture mondaine ; or, les textes mêmes permettent de saisir leurs liens réciproques, voire l'osmose qui se produisit entre elles.

The first topic is *historia litteraria*. The term rings few bells today. What political correctness would make of it is anybody's guess. Its only trace in modern usage, as far as I can see, is when one speaks of the literature of a subject.

My example is Christoph August Heumann. I have chosen Heumann because his role in the heyday of *historia litteraria*—the first half of the eighteenth century—is both central and problematic. In 1718 Heumann published what he is probably best known for: *Conspectus reipublicae litterariae, sive via ad historiam litterariam iuventuti studiosae aperta*, 'a survey of the republic of letters, or the way opened for the studious young to *historia litteraria*'. It went through eight editions spread over the entire century. The two parts of the title add up to a major programmatic statement: the written discourse of the republic of letters is *historia litteraria*. The work has five headings: (1) on the art of writing; (2) on the origin of *studia litteraria*, how they spread, and through what vicissitudes they have come down to us; (3) on the disciplines, their growth and decline; (4) on books of all kinds; (5) on authors. This brings together topics that will subsequently separate.

For Heumann every discipline, be it grammar, mathematics, or theology, has a *historia litteraria* of its own, which is indispensable to it, an antidote against dogmatism and the cult of authority. 'It is worth noting', says Heumann, 'that in former centuries'—he has the Middle Ages in mind—'in which the study of *historia litteraria* was frozen, philosophers followed with blind faith, in the manner of sheep, their Aristotle, as did jurisconsults their Bartolus, and theologians their Thomas.' Today, with *historia litteraria* flourishing, not only philosophers but jurisconsults, historians, doctors of medicine, philologists, and indeed theologians have become eclectics and solidly learned. Thus *historia litteraria* is the light of truth and the mother of intellectual freedom (1763 edn, p. 5 n. (h)).

But the standpoint from which this liberation through learning was offered remained unreflected, and this soon showed. *Historia litteraria* turned out not to be confessionally neutral. Heumann asks quite unabashedly whether, had

Both systematically (by virtue of what it held together) and historically (its dissolution and the redistribution of its components) historia litteraria invites further study.

historia litteraria existed in the Middle Ages, the papacy would have been quite so politically oppressive as it in fact was. Moreover—and here I follow the very attractive thesis presented by Walter Sparr at the colloquium on eighteenth-century biblical exegesis held at Wolfenbüttel in 1985¹—Heumann's conclusions on the Eucharist, which brought him into conflict with his colleagues at the Theological Faculty of Göttingen, exposed the limitations and signalled the demise of the kind of tolerant eclecticism on which *historia litteraria* was predicated.

To sum up, both systematically (by virtue of what it held together) and historically (the determinants of its dissolution, and the consequent redistribution of its components) *historia litteraria* invites further study.

The other topic is history and law. In spite of the pioneering work of Donald Kelley (*Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship: Language, Law and History in the French Renaissance*, 1970) and Notker Hammerstein (*Jus und Historia: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des historischen Denkens an deutschen Universitäten im späten 17. und im 18. Jahrhundert*, 1972) law, the history of law, and history in law continue to be a specialist domain, not readily entered in historical, especially historiographical studies. This estrangement masks a common past, and is perhaps the consequence of an attempted marriage in the seventeenth century which gave rise to a divorce at the beginning of the eighteenth.

Taking up the ideas of sixteenth-century French lawyers, Johann Eisenhart proposed a *dextrarum iunctio* between history and law at the University of Helmstedt in 1667. While jurisprudence was then a fully-fledged, self-governing discipline, history was not—and was not to become one for another century. It served other disciplines as a common repository of materials. The match with law was unequal, and when Eisenhart attempted to build on it in

his treatise on *fides historica* (the purpose of which was to determine the nature of valid historical proof, that is, to vindicate history not merely as a treasury of examples but as a bearer of truth) he based his demonstration on formal criteria used to establish the validity as proof of historiographical material in courts of law. This left entire the problem of the substantive truthfulness or otherwise of historical accounts, and at the turn of the century Christian Thomasius, using the Pyrrhonist mode, had no difficulty in showing that Eisenhart's proofs were no proofs at all.

Thomasius never tired of insisting on the importance of history as a basis for law. He had no conception of the autonomy of history: in relation to law its role was crucial but subordinate. Nonetheless, Thomasius released it from its subjection to legal standards by differentiating between *fides historica* and *fides iuridica*. The latter was bound by rules, the former was not. Thomasius deplorably recognized the operation of the latter as a fact of life, but his intellectual, indeed spiritual sympathies lay with the discretionary skepticism he postulated for the former. A great jurist and a determined secularist, Thomasius was also a radical Lutheran. His conception of law was inspired by Pauline antilegalism. He wanted to clear law of what he considered as Caesaropapist distortions, which had converted into a system of peremptory rules what, before Justinian, before Constantine, indeed before Christianity grown papal began to take it over, had been—and should be—a body of opinion. This implied the same epistemological status for law as the one postulated for history: the servant cut the master down to size. Thomasius held that neither history nor law could aspire to apodeictic certainty. The appropriate level for both was that of informed probability.

The implications of this epistemological modesty for the various procedures of *fides historica* were worked out within a few years out by Friedrich Wilhelm Bierling in his *De iudicio historico* and *Commentatio de Pyrrhonismo historico*. No type of historical material was free of the *formido oppositi*, the fear that the opposite might be the case. But what it could offer, if only at the level of probability, bore on fact, not on the formality of its attestation. It was a cool and cloudy dawn of what half a century later became a sunny day for history, when it began to establish its autonomy in the school of Göttingen. The vicissitudes of its relationship with law offer another field for further investigation.

¹ 'Philosophische Historie und dogmatische Heterodoxie: der Fall des Exegeten Christoph August Heumann', in *Historische Kritik und biblischer Kanon in der deutschen Aufklärung*, Wolfenbütteler Forschungen 41 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1988), 171 ff.

DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

Prolegomena to the study of Intellectual History

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Intellectual history has become a well-recognized field in this century, but it occupies still an anomalous position. On the one hand it is regarded as a sub-department of the discipline of history; on the other hand it reaches out to aspects of thought and culture, high and low, which have not, classically and normally, been the province of most writers of history and yet which arguably offer greater challenges than war, politics, and institutions and other common preoccupations of historians. Nor have theoreticians of history confronted the problems of intellectual history nearly as seriously as they have the methods for studying the public—the economic, social, and political—world, which have customarily served to define the proper study of history. Why should this be?

The short answer is that intellectual history is an irretrievably interdisciplinary area of inquiry, and that its primary topics of inquiry—philosophy, literature, language, art, science, and other disciplines—each has its own tradition of historical inquiry. The result is that intellectual history has had to invent, or to appropriate, concepts to define its area of competence and cognizance: the history of philosophy (in an extended sense), the history of culture (in a restricted sense), or more problematic formulations, such as the history of ideas, the history of thought, the human spirit, ideologies, and more modern fashions serving the same function, such as *mentalités* and, most recently, cultural memory.

This eclecticism, with its interdisciplinary implications, is all to the good; and I should be sorry to be understood as defending a particular

approach to intellectual history simply because I happen to be the editor of a journal associated with one or more less recognizable ‘canon’, viz. that of Arthur O. Lovejoy’s philosophically oriented ‘history of ideas’, founded three generations ago. In fact in my own view, irrespective of its conceptual value, the leap of faith required for Lovejoy’s programme is too much for many historians to make. History as a discipline has lost its innocence, including its faith in metahistorical and metalinguistic ‘ideas’ and the sort of stable truth that goes along with them. As historians, in other words, we have access only to concrete expressions of ideas, which must take the form of language or an analogous mode of communication. We use words, read texts, experience communicative satisfaction; but what lies behind this process is anybody’s judgement.

With respect to the ‘past’ and the ‘dialogues’ with the dead in which intellectual historians must engage, such communication is even more difficult; and we are in something uncomfortably like the Chinese-room predicament, or even the Martians watching the football game. We hear, see, have an ‘idea’ of something, and perhaps even have a name for it; but what on earth does it mean? As scholars, moreover, however much we may study and travel, we continue to live and learn within small horizons which can never accommodate truth as philosophers have conceived it. As Barry Allen has remarked, ‘We cannot speak the truth; words cannot mimic the way the world is; language imposes subjects and predicates on a world that does not have stable, enduring units corresponding to its terms.’¹ How much less can historians speak the truth of the way the world was—and its languages were?

For me, in any case, intellectual history is not a department of history but rather a way, or a set of ways, of trying to view the whole range of humanity’s past—the acts and creations which have left intelligible and communicable traces.

¹ *Truth in Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), 46–7.

Intellectual history is not a department of history but rather a way, or a set of ways, of trying to view the whole range of humanity's past—the acts and creations which have left intelligible and communicable traces.

In terms of hermeneutics intellectual history is not really a discipline but rather a point of view (*Sehepunkt* is the term introduced by Chladenius in the mid-eighteenth century) within a discipline, which is history. The office of the intellectual historian is to explore those areas of the human past in which decipherable traces, usually written or iconographic, have survived, and then to give contemporary meaning to these traces through the medium of language. Intellectual historians may always apply to disciplines such as economics, sociology, political science, anthropology, philosophy, and especially—given the hermeneutical condition and goals of their enterprise—the humanities, beginning with literature and criticism; but at the same time they should not forget their mission or the limits imposed by their cultural horizons and disciplinary limitations.

In general history can never 'speak' except through human ventriloquism, and (to invoke Lyotard) there can be no meta-narratives. We have, of course, founded all sorts of ideologies and utopias, but as frameworks for the story of humanity they all sooner or later come to grief. So, the doctors will always disagree and revisionisms will always recur: 'Sceptical doubt, both with respect to reason and the senses', as Hume wrote, 'is a malady which can never be radically cured, but must return upon us in every moment, however we may chase it away.' And this too, no doubt, is all to the good.

The Rise and Decline of Intellectual History

.....
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There is a history of the rise and decline of Intellectual History, as a discipline in this century.

It goes something like this: The subject has murky, nineteenth-century origins in a widened understanding of a text-dependent *Kulturgeschichte*. It flourished, however, in the pre- and immediately post-war years under a new guise, as the History of Ideas and in North America. Here it became associated with Arthur Lovejoy's project of establishing 'unit ideas' that could be traced, regardless of context or authorial intention, through historical time and across space and genre. It was also linked to Lovejoy's *Journal of the History of Ideas*. This history was neither the history of the intellectual *Geist* of a given time and place (as, say, Dilthey's early work had been), nor the was it the more obviously philosophical history (most properly a *Geistesgeschichte*), which had been around since at least the eighteenth century and whose purpose was largely philosophical. As Hegel famously said, to write the history of philosophy is to do philosophy. The history of unit ideas, whatever else it was, was not doing philosophy.

The History of Ideas, although it produced some notable works (now about due for re-evaluation) did very little for philosophy—most of which at the time was resolutely anti-historical—nor did philosophy do very much for it; neither did it have very much impact on such neighbouring concerns as literary history. Historians who knew that the past was composed of events also tended to ignore it. 'Flapdoodle' as Namier, trying hard to pass for an English gentleman, once described it. Past agents, it was also assumed (if only tacitly), had nothing in their heads when they acted—nothing, that is, except personal interests, which were formed entirely by proto-rational-choice models. In the 1960s this general attitude towards the study of past thinking was replaced by a claim that, even if past agents did have things in their heads, those things were generally unexamined, unreflected-upon, and frequently imposed. Intellectual History, which was the study of reflective texts, and necessarily the texts produced by small élite, was thus deemed to be epiphenomenal. The History of Ideas died, and was replaced by histories of 'mentalities', as a subsidiary of a broader social history, which was believed to be, in some sense, about the 'real', the lived, lives of ordinary people.

'Mentality', in this context, looked suspiciously like the earlier concept of an 'ideology' but was believed to have penetrated deeper into the habits and customs of peoples, ordinary and

not so ordinary. Ideologies, that is, were political, mentalities predominantly cultural. What was left of the old Lovejoy project collapsed into an increasingly narrow concern with philology and the hunt for 'influences' of one writer upon another, later one. It was replaced, too, and with a far greater degree of success, by a number of ancillary histories: the history of the book, the social history of ideas, the history of intellectual groups, and so on. All of these were, at one level or another, concerned to deny that the content of the texts they studied were of any real historical significance. At much the same time, Intellectual History was re-invented out of post-Hegelian hermeneutic theories as a late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century concern with ideologies. In the United States today, Intellectual History is a term that describes a generally Marxist, sometimes Freudian, increasingly post-structuralist understanding of the ordering of the political consciousness of the past hundred years or so.

The only major divergence from this dual trajectory has been in the study of the history of political thought, first in Britain and the United States and now increasingly in France, Germany, and Italy. This has for long been emphatically historicist, even when it has also insisted that its role is closely associated with modern political developments and political ideologies. What has vanished, seemingly for good, is the possibility of writing an intellectual history that, as Lovejoy's did, traverses distinctions between genres and has something to say about changes over long periods of time.

Since the collapse of popularist historiography—or rather its appropriation by the Right—a more broadly perceived Intellectual History is making something of a comeback even if, at present, only as a modified form of one or another of the older more established areas of inquiry: as an extension of the history of political thought or of literary studies, the history of science or of art or music, and so on. It is also significant that there seems to be increasingly more space for the subject within the traditional structure of the universities. Cambridge now has no less than three readers in the subject (although two of them have prefixed other topics to their titles). The chair at Sussex, created *ad hominem* for John Burrow, has now been established, although it has still to be filled.

I would like to suggest that although this history is at best incomplete, and much of it questionable, it does demonstrate two things. The first is that what the new Intellectual History

Intellectual History is making a comeback, even if only as an extension of the history of political thought or of literary studies, the history of science or of art or music.

now needs to do, and what this Society will surely help it to do, is to establish an identity, one that is identical with neither the history of philosophy as Hegel and his successors understood the term (although I still believe that that is our nearest ally) nor with the history of political thought as it is done in most Anglo-American university departments. Nor can the new brand of Intellectual History be merely a resuscitation of Lovejoy's original project, much less of the kind of pedestrian, if often worthy, scholarship which clogged the pages of the *Journal of the History of Ideas* for so long before it was rescued by Don Kelley. The human sciences will always be at the mercy of whatever the *Geist* most urgently wants to know about. It is, after all, one of the things which distinguishes them from the natural sciences. And the *Geist* of 2000 has other concerns than those which agitated the professors of the pre-war years. Quite what this new history will look like I cannot say. But I suspect that it will be far less obviously historicist than its predecessors, far less timid about its focus on ideas, and perhaps, too, less concerned with linguistics than it has been recently.

The other point is that this Society should not allow itself to become dominated by any one group or school or by the particular research projects and research habits of one particular period or nation. Intellectual History can only really work if classicists can talk to modernists, if historians of science can talk to historians of music, and so on. At the moment there exists no forum for this. This Society should attempt to become that forum.

Was ist „Intellectual History“?

.....

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Wie hätten Sie's gerne? Doch wohl nicht übersetzt als Intellektualgeschichte und auch

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nicht *histoire intellectuelle*! Schon die Übersetzung des Terminus des französischen „histoire des mentalités“ oder der „histoire de la pensée“ nahekommt, ist bestreitbar, und im Deutschen ist die Frage nicht leichter. Natürlich beerbt „Intellectual History“ die Geistesgeschichte; sie hat selbstverständlich auch eine große Nähe zur Kulturgeschichte. Aber das sind nationale Traditionen, und ein wesentliches Ziel der *International Society for Intellectual History* ist es, diese nationalen Traditionen miteinander ins Gespräch zu bringen. Wenn dabei die nationalen begrifflichen Tradition miteinander konkurrieren, ist das genau das, was von einer *Intellectual History* erwartet wird.

Da Begriffsbestimmungen nicht nur die Definition von den Rändern her betreffen, sondern vor allem deren Inhalt, erscheint es sinnvoll, den Begriff *Intellectual History* mit einigen Stichworten zu kennzeichnen.

Intellectual History beschäftigt sich mit Philosophiegeschichte, Geschichte der Wissenschaften, zumal der Geisteswissenschaften, der Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung, mit Theologie- und Ketzergeschichte, Rechtsgeschichte und Geschichte der Philologie, Geschichte der Kunst und zumal mit deren Konzepten.

Die Geschichte des Wissens hängt mit der Geschichte der Institutionen eng zusammen, in denen das Wissen vermittelt, vergrößert und kommuniziert wurde: Deshalb gehören Universitätsgeschichte, Geschichte der Akademien, Höfe, Klöster und Schulen mit zum Gegenstand der *Intellectual History*. Das gilt ebenso für die Geschichte des Buchdrucks und des Buchhandels, den Wandel der Kommunikationsformen und Medien, für die Geschichte des Lesens, der Zensur, der clandestinen Literatur, die Geschichte der Gelehrten und Intellektuellen, die Geschichte der Gelehrtenrepublik und deren Wandlungen.

In gewisser Hinsicht impliziert *Intellectual History* auch ein kulturgeschichtliches Programm (im Sinne von Aby Warburg). Sie umfaßt somit zugleich Hermeneutik und deren Ge-

schichte, Ideengeschichte, Begriffsgeschichte, Geschichte von Glauben und Aberglauben, Geistesgeschichte und Weltanschauungsgeschichte. Sie verschließt sich nicht der Diskursgeschichte und meint auch die Geschichte literarischer, gelehrter und wissenschaftlicher Topoi, sie bedenkt die Nationalliteraturen, auch in ihrem Verhältnis zueinander, und beschäftigt sich mit literarischer Kritik.

Es könnte scheinen als gäbe es kaum noch ein Feld, das nicht Teil der *Intellectual History* wäre; dem ist jedoch keineswegs so. *Intellectual History* ist ein historisches Geschäft, deshalb umfaßt sie zum Beispiel weder analytische Philosophie noch *Philosophy of Mind*, ihr Gegenstand ist weder Sprachphilosophie noch Grammatik. Auch als historisches Fach ist *Intellectual History* nicht universal: Politische Geschichte ist nicht ihr Gegenstand, auch Sozialgeschichte nicht, soweit die sich mit den Institutionen der *Intellectual History* beschäftigt. Dasselbe gilt für Sozialpsychologie und Psychoanalyse. Diese sind als historische Phänomene natürlich Gegenstand der *Intellectual History*—nicht aber als Methoden der Geschichte.

Intellectual History ist eine historische Disziplin. Von ihrem Gegenstand her behandelt sie vornehmlich westliche Traditionen; aber gerade deshalb ist sie dafür geeignet, nicht-westliche Kulturen mit westlicher Kulturgeschichte zu vergleichen. Wenn sich *Intellectual History* als wirklich international und weltweit versteht, ist es eine ihrer vornehmsten Aufgaben, das gegenseitige kulturelle Verständnis mit wissenschaftlichen Methode zu ermöglichen.

Als geschichtliche Disziplin ist *Intellectual History* sozusagen natürlich damit befaßt, Geschichte von Entwicklungen, Brüchen, Kontinuitäten zu behandeln; das gilt von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Wo es ihre Aufgabe ist, international zu wirken, spielt die Geschichte der nationalen und übernationalen Traditionen der *Intellectual History* eine wesentliche Rolle, denn die Kenntnis der Partikularitäten ist Voraussetzung für die Hermeneutik des Ganzen.

Es bedarf wohl keiner Frage, daß *Intellectual History* keine zeitlichen Begrenzungen leidet; wenn sie das Programm einer vergleichenden Kulturgeschichte mit umfassen will. Gerade deshalb hat sie natürlich einen enzyklopädischen Charakter, der selbst nicht ohne historische Signatur ist.

Das Interesse an einer internationalen Beschäftigung mit *Intellectual History* ist aus der Beschäftigung mit der Frühen Neuzeit erwach-

sen. Es hat sich gezeigt, daß in dieser Epoche die nationalen Klassifikationen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts unpassend sind, daß die wichtige historische Entwicklungen verstellen und ver- kennen. Das mag zunächst ein kontingentes Fak- tum sein, aber es macht deutlich, daß die natio- nalen Traditionen der Wissenskommunikation damals—und wohl auch heute—unzureichend waren und sind. Die Beschäftigung mit den Themen der Frühen Neuzeit spielt deshalb si- cher eine wichtige Rolle in der *Intellectual His- tory*. Es hat den Eindruck, als begreife sich *Intel- lectual History* selbst in der tradition der Gelehrten- geschichte, die sie selbst als ihren Ge- genstand behandelt. Wenn dieser Eindruck stimmen sollte, wäre das vielleicht gar nicht so schlecht.

Intellectual History and Historiography

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Intellectual history seems to have enjoyed a very positive success in the last decade. While social history went through an evident crisis and a new cultural history undertook interest- ing breeding experiments with anthropology and literary criticism, an increasing number of monographs have mentioned intellectual his- tory in their titles: historians apparently con- sider the term appropriate to their aims not- withstanding the fact that, as Peter Novick has recently reminded us, 'Nailing jelly to the wall was a crusty political historian's characteriza- tion of the attempt to write intellectual his- tory.'¹ Librarians seem to have a more definite idea of what 'intellectual history' is up to: more than a hundred books published in the last ten years are listed under the heading 'intellectual history' at the British Library.

A common element is not easy to identify in terms of a single area of investigation or a shared set of assumptions about historical real- ity, its structure and the relation between the past and the historian. Political economy, urban planning, politics in Renaissance England, Ro-

A 'should-be' definition of intellectual history, as expressing the concern with human self- understanding, on the one hand lacks a clear focus and on the other is overambitious.

man poetry—all these themes have been re- cently analysed in terms of intellectual history, or at least their authors assumed they were do- ing so.² It must be added that 'intellectual histo- rians' approach their topics with different tech- niques and different questions. Is it possible or meaningful to force these different researches into a single mould? The old philosophical dic- tum *nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensus* does not help us define what intellectual history is about (intellectual history would be all historical writing).

Nor is intellectual history in its present form identical with the 'history of ideas' as Lovejoy thought it should be in the 1920s and 1930s. From this vantage point the concern with the necessity of an unbroken continuity expressed in Donald Kelley's otherwise very important essays is misplaced.³ The appeal to the out- standing accomplishments of the past and pre- sent members of the History of Ideas Club, founded by Arthur Lovejoy, Gilbert Chinard, and George Boas in Baltimore in 1923, can be very moving. However, a 'should-be' definition of intellectual history, as expressing the concern with human self-understanding, on the one hand lacks a clear focus and on the other is overambitious (indeed intellectual history shares this concern with quite a few other disci- plines!).⁴

I would rather pick up Kelley's descriptive definition of intellectual history as comprising

² Jean-Claude Perrot, *Une histoire intellectuelle de l'éco- nomie politique: 17.-18. siècle* (Paris: Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1992); Peter Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow: an Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); Stephen Collins, *From Di- vine Cosmos to Sovereign State: an Intellectual History of Consciousness and the Idea of Order in Renaissance England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), J. D. Maynard, *Lucretius and the Late Republic: an Essay in Roman Intellectual History* (Leiden: Brill, 1985).

³ 'Horizons of Intellectual History: Retrospect, Cir- cumspect, Prospect', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 48 (1987): 143-69 and 'What is Happening to the History of Ideas?', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 51 (1990): 3- 25 (reprinted in this issue, pp. 36-50).

⁴ 'What is Happening to the History of Ideas?', 25 (50).

¹ Peter Novick, *The Noble Dream: the 'Objectivity Ques- tion' and the American Historical Profession* (Cam- bridge University Press, 1988), 7.

If political theorists could be persuaded to participate in a Society for Intellectual History, their attention might be drawn to the alternative way of reading, which is understanding previous thinkers in their contexts.

a range of approaches to texts,⁵ which intellectual historians analyse with all possible techniques and asking all possible questions. I would suggest that typical of the intellectual historian is keeping in mind two points, which distinguish the approach in terms of intellectual history from other perfectly legitimate approaches. The first point is the texts' nature as historical artefacts, produced in time, before and after other texts, while the second point is the texts' relevance to a historical problem, whose analysis requires the assumption of a non-textual reality, which the historian projects from his present into the past. Intellectual history is therefore a common ground, strongly interdisciplinary but clearly staked out, for historians of various origins (the historical interest is crucial).

In 1938 Lovejoy listed twelve points forming a rubric for the history of ideas to come. Kelley has aptly commented on the changes that took place ever since. In fact priorities have varied in the last fifty years even more than Kelley is ready to assume.⁶ I plead for the extension of the rubric to include topics whose relevance has dramatically increased for intellectual historians. The history of historiography is prominent among them. There are quite a few reasons why history of historiography belongs to 'intellectual history'. It seems to me that what Lovejoy called *Wissensoziologie* and Kelley sees as entering eclipse,⁷ has been integrated in the last decades into an enlarged vision of the history of historiography that borders on and shares perspectives and problems with the history of science and the analysis of collective imagination. History of historiography has ceased to be the learned description of the straightforward progress to the historical truth. Direct and immediate contact with the past has been acknowledged to be a chimera. If experience of the past is possible at all, it must be either the aesthetic grasping of surviving fragments or the analysis of texts of whatever nature in order to assess

their meaning in our cultural context. A specialized discipline dealing critically with the attempt to make sense of history is relevant to all branches of history, and especially so to intellectual historians, who are in the first place interested in the relationship between texts and worlds of experience. Besides, it is worth noting that as history of historiography is potentially a pervasive approach, it would greatly profit from a constant interaction with the challenges coming from the wider, interdisciplinary field of 'intellectual history'.

Intellectual History in Political Theory

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An International Society for Intellectual History might make a breakthrough possible for the intellectual history of political theory.

By far the better part of political theory is carried out in historical terms. That is, if we want to think about any question or dilemma in political theory, we begin with a survey of what previous thinkers have said and build upon that basis. This way of thinking is frustrating to some, because it means that reading Habermas, for example, requires familiarity with Durkheim, Weber, Mead, and a host of other figures. The answer to those who question the necessity for this is that this just is the way most great figures think. Those who are not willing to think through the work of the previous thinkers just will not understand Habermas.

There are at least two ways of thinking through the meaning of the previous writers in order to understand Habermas. One is to read their work as a series of analytical points, with no understanding of their contexts, problems, etc. This may be the more common way, but it can lead to unsatisfactory results, missing their points and Habermas's point in citing them. Political theorists of the analytical stripe who talk only with other analytical theorists will never come to appreciate what they are missing. Hence the potential value of talking to other intellectual historians. If political theorists could be persuaded to participate in a Society for Intellectual History, their attention might be

⁵ Ibid., 19 (46).

⁶ Ibid., 13-17 (42-5).

⁷ Ibid., 17 (45).

drawn to the alternative way of reading, which is understanding those previous thinkers in their contexts.

One problem is that many political theorists enter the field because they have been impressed by the writings of one or a few famous thinkers. When they come to the professional study of these famous thinkers, they tend to learn about them in an ahistorical way. A 'canon' that jumps from Hobbes to Locke to Rousseau to Mill has long dominated the anglophone academic world. When people read these figures in isolation they are engaged in what I think of as an eerie conversation across the centuries and linguistic boundaries. They neglect the minor figures, who might have been more on the mind of a major figure than a distant 'great'. A Society for Intellectual History might draw their attention to these minor figures.

Many political theorists do look at context, but only at the narrowest of contexts. Besides missing 'minor' figures, anglophone theorists also miss 'great' figures from other languages, such as Pufendorf, who has been the subject of a revival only recently. Another service a Society for Intellectual History could perform would be to help American political theorists see outside of their narrow anglophone world. For example, recent work by an outstanding scholar, Richard Ashcraft, reads Locke only in an English context. It is a rather remarkable truth that no treatment of Locke's *Letter on Toleration*, written in Latin after several years of contact with Dutch scholars such as Limborch and Van Paets, reads Locke's work in its Dutch context. Raymond Klibansky's edition of the letter drew

the Dutch context to our attention, but he did not hazard an interpretation of its influence on Locke's meaning.

Yet another problem in political theory is that even if 'minor' and 'great' figures from several countries are surveyed, theorists may miss the importance of other fields. Few great political thinkers saw themselves as simply political thinkers. Most were involved in a variety of fields from natural science to *belles-lettres* to art. Sometimes their work in one field gave them ideas for their work in political theory. Yet another service that a Society could perform would be to help political theorists understand the history of ideas from other fields. Interchanges with historians of ideas in those fields can help the political theorists explore such possibilities. To take only one example, one of the major neglected fields among political theorists is theology, so much a part of the earlier intellectual world, and so absent in much of the American intellectual scene today. Political theorists may not even recognize a theological argument that is staring them in the face.

The upshot is that the major service of a Society for Intellectual History would be the opportunity to observe and interact with colleagues in other disciplines and from other countries. I know from my own experience that I have learned much more from interchanges with historians and philosophers than from other political theorists. I find most discussions of political theory at major national conventions rather sterile. I would prefer to have my work critiqued by people from other disciplines.

VIEWS OF INTELLECTUAL HISTORY FROM THE CZECH REPUBLIC, SWEDEN, AND ISRAEL

Comenius Studies and Intellectual History in the Czech Republic

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brief statement. First I will try to show some problems of Intellectual History as a field of study we are grappling with in the Czech Republic. In the second part, then, I will acquaint you with the projects of my department and with the review *Acta Comeniana*. My statement will be mostly limited to the period of seventeenth-century history, which is my own field of interest.

I should like to mention two subjects in my

Unfortunately there is no institution in the

The very term 'intellectual history' has no equivalent in Czech, and usually Czech historians use terms such as 'history of thought', 'history of ideas', or simply 'cultural history' in a broad sense.

Czech Republic specializing in Intellectual History. The very term 'intellectual history' has no equivalent in Czech, and usually Czech historians use terms such as 'history of thought' (*dějiny myšlení*), 'history of ideas' (*dějiny ideí*), or simply 'cultural history' (*kulturní dějiny*) in a broad sense. Traditional subjects such as the history of philosophy and the history of literature are naturally represented at the universities and the institutes of the Czech Academy of Sciences. However, neither the history of science nor the history of culture have their own specialized institutions comparable to the Institute for the History of Science in Warsaw or to the Centre for Renaissance Studies in Budapest. The ambitious team dealing to some extent with early modern intellectual history are well established at the Institute for the History of Charles University (which recently published two splendid volumes of the history of Charles University, 1347–1802), and at the Institute of Philosophy (Comenius Studies Department). Other interesting projects are connected with outstanding scholars and their seminars. Stanislav Sousedík (Charles University) analyses seventeenth-century Bohemian philosophy in his pioneering studies; Noemi Rejchrtová (Charles University) deals with the history of Bohemian Protestantism; Josef Petrů's (Charles University) voluminous work includes studies in cultural history, historiography, and the history of Charles University; Jaroslav Pánek (Charles University) studies political ideas in the context of Bohemian political history; and Josef Válka (Masaryk University, Brno) examines political and social thought in his brilliant works.

Although the Society for the History of Science and Technology publishes a journal, the position of the history of science at universities and at the Academy of Sciences is still very weak. The field is dominated by natural scientists, whose interests and methodological approach are usually isolated from broader historical discussions. There is a serious lack of authoritative works and scholars such as the late

historian of natural sciences and Kepler scholar, Zdeněk Horský (1929–1988).

In recent decades official historiography emphasized the Marxist concept of economic and social history, and this inhibited the free development of the history of ideas and intellectual history. Regarding seventeenth-century history, communist ideology considered the Baroque epoch as a deep decline in the history of the Czech nation. Thus serious research in the field was constantly subjected to prejudices, restrictions, censorship, and even to open persecution. The rise of Baroque studies in the 1990s is one of the most interesting phenomena of Czech early modern historiography. Many subjects hitherto neglected are now being addressed, especially in the field of literary history (for example Alexandr Stich, Martin Svatoš, Milan Kopecký, Jaromír Linda).

At present there are additional factors make it difficult to develop the field. There is a lack of finances for new institutions, teams, or projects wishing to study Intellectual History. A more serious problem is the traditional mutual distrust existing between historians and philosophers. The roots of this distrust go back to the end of the nineteenth century. Nowadays, historians ignore or belittle Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, and the majority of philosophers disregard History. In addition, new factors are arising. Many young philosophers doubt whether the History of Philosophy is Philosophy, and almost all historians distrust great theories. Another basic problem is the deficiency of specialized literature. Only one name comes to mind if one starts to think about English-speaking authors dealing with the intellectual history of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who have had some influence upon Czech scholars during the last two decades—R. J. W. Evans. On the other hand, the works of Frances A. Yates, Charles Webster, Quentin Skinner, or Richard Popkin are known only within a closed circle of scholars. These books are very seldom found in Czech libraries, and almost none of them have been translated into Czech. The International Society might at the very least give us moral support and help us to find funding for translation and publication of important works on intellectual history into Czech.

Let me now turn to the second part of my statement. I work at the Institute of Philosophy, the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic as a researcher of the Comenius Studies Department. The main project of the department is the

preparation of an edition of *Johannis Amos Comenii Opera omnia*. The edition began to appear in 1969 and comprises up to the present day 15 volumes out of a proposed 60. The aim of the edition is to present a reliable text of the edited works and manuscripts, with a textual appendix recording the changes undergone by each work during the author's life. The explanatory notes deal with the context—historical, philosophical, theological, etc.—of Comenius' work, with its sources and textual parallels. The editorial team consists primarily of philologists, but historians and philosophers are also represented. Among the present members of the editorial team are two direct pupils of the founders of the edition, Dr Martin Steiner and Dr Jiří Beneš, both philologists and outstanding Comenius scholars.

Another project connected directly with the edition is the difficult task of establishing an authoritative edition of Comenius' correspondence. The project started in 1995; its aim is to create a computer database of all the surviving letters of Comenius and to publish two volumes listing his correspondence. This list will not only be of basic importance for Comenius studies, but furthermore it also relates to the study of seventeenth-century Bohemian cultural history, to the history of the Bohemian exile after the Battle of the White Mountain, last but not least to the history of ideas and intellectual communication in seventeenth-century Europe. In this broader context the project is closely connected with the Hartlib Papers Project (University of Sheffield) as well as with the project to establish a co-ordinated electronic database of crucial manuscript materials (particularly the correspondence of outstanding intellectuals) of the seventeenth century.

Let me now say a few words about the international review of Comenius studies, *Acta Comeniana*. The review followed the *Archive pro badání o životě a spisech J. A. Komenského* founded in 1910 by Ján Kvačala, an outstanding Comenius, Campanella, Alsted, and Leibniz scholar. After interruption to its publication during World War II, production of the journal was resumed in 1957 (with the sub-title *Acta Comeniana*). Since 1969 it has been issued as a serial published in the major languages. A respectable level of scholarship was maintained in the review during the last decade of the communist regime thanks to the general editor Dr Marta Bečková, an expert on Comenius and seventeenth-century Polish history. I collaborated with her as the co-editor of the last vol-

umes. After the 400th anniversary of J. A. Comenius' birth, commemorated also by Volume 10 of *Acta Comeniana*, we felt that some period of Comenius studies as well as of the history of *Acta Comeniana* had finished. We decided to change the orientation of the review slightly, opening it to wider discussion in the field of early modern intellectual history. The first result is Volume 11 of *Acta Comeniana*, which has been published recently. It contains seven articles dealing with matters other than Comenius: Descartes, political theory of the Bohemian Estates' Revolt, seventeenth-century panpsychism and hylozoism, Antitrinitarianism in Bohemia, etc. We have enlarged the number of book reviews and offer a good survey of books on Early Modern Intellectual History published by Central-European scholars in minor languages. We intend to publish *Acta* annually, but as you surely understand the realization of these purposes is dependent upon the interest of the international reading public. We shall probably lose some interested among pedagogues, but I hope we shall find many new ones among historians of ideas, historians of science, historians of intellectual life.

I was able to come to London thanks to the kind recommendation of Dr Charles Webster and his concern for the review *Acta Comeniana*. To conclude, I would like to express my gratitude to him and to the *spiritus agens* of the enterprise, Constance Blackwell, for their support.

A View from afar—The International Society for Intellectual History

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Coming from a country on the periphery, with a language that few handle with ease outside Scandinavia, the first thing we realize is that nothing is more crucial than the way we write. History and ideas cannot be abstracted from language and national styles without a loss of the very essence of our cultures. While we all teach the central European canon, from Christine de Pisan to Machiavelli, from Vico to Walter Benjamin, most of us work in local archives and do research in our national traditions.

Although the languages of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are close, and while there are many Swedish-speaking scholars in Finland, there still is very little real co-operation. Very few northern comparisons have been made; much work has instead been directed to studying the reception of various European phenomena in national contexts.

Typical research programmes in my northern vicinity are studies of the rise of, and more recent threats to, the 'Swedish model' of paternalistic social engineering: localized studies of the national social programs for good living, good taste, good hygiene, even sex education, to the rise of sophisticated distributional economics. Earlier studies concentrate on local intellectual milieux, depicting the slow reception of the Enlightenment in the small town of Calmar in 1780–1820 (using Graham Swift's *Waterland*), or investigating the culture of sociability of country spas. There is much interest in counter-cultures: on the constitution of gender and the female image in the eighteenth-century literary press, in the activities and debates of early student societies, in the proliferation of spiritism and theosophical societies. Counter-Enlightenment trends are studied by re-editing texts on alchemy and romanticism, nostalgic studies of medieval architectural trends, examination of biomedical ideas of *fin-de-siècle* Oscarian society, and in the emergence of the criticism of mass culture.

A recent trend attempts to avoid seeing past centuries in relation to modernization, but instead to see them in terms of their own ideology. This might mean a study of the growth of Gothic myths. For example, myths fabricated to solidify the national understanding in Sweden/Finland from about 1450 to 1750, when Gothicism finally was discredited scientifically and abandoned because of an influx of cosmopolitan ideals. It is fascinating to follow the changes in function of these Gothic ideologies through the generations. They were formulated as a mytho-poetic response to centralizing Catholic trends by Johannes Magnus in the early sixteenth century on his visit to Rome, and later used as a literary format by Masonic historicists such as Olof von Dalin. The perspective has now shifted from seeing how a cul-

ture on the periphery merely receives ideas through its own special filter, to the attempt to get closer to the indigenous conditions themselves, to those ideas that shaped the dreams of northern culture, even with its complex web of misunderstanding and myths.

The most natural conference for us would be the biennial Nordic Conference, but although the languages of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are close, and while there are many Swedish-speaking scholars in Finland, there still is very little real co-operation of this sort. Very few northern comparisons have been made; much work has instead been directed to studying the reception of various European phenomena in national contexts; on the emergence of Paracelsism in Sweden, on the apparent lack of a solid 'French Enlightenment' in Sweden, on the reception of Darwin, Freud, Jung, Cassirer in Sweden, etc. Philosophy has its share, from studies on the academic Hegelian Johan Jacob Boström, to the conceptual critic Adolph Phalén and the value-nihilist Axel Hägerström. With this localized interest, the writing of biographies has returned as a serious intellectual genre in Sweden. There is, however, a stronger current of interest in studying the thought-collectives and thinking styles made visible in localized debates, that is, with an emphasis on Skinner-type readings of confrontation and rhetorical strategies.

It is to be hoped that an international meeting-place for intellectual history in itself would create new topics, and by this confrontation of styles make possible bolder comparisons between national traditions. The recent tendency that historical study of Swedish cultural connections in Germany, France, Russia, Italy, Estonia, etc. has taken—a sort of Euro-diplomacy cultivated by linguistic specialists in the various languages concerned—could thus be redirected. Instead these topics of art and literature could, if opportunity was given, be integrated into what is normally done in departments of intellectual history. In this sense the first International Conference for Intellectual History can open up new vistas and perhaps approach the influence of the widely attended History of Science conferences.

For reference

Susanna Åkerman, *Queen Christina and Her Circle: the Transformation of a Seventeenth-Century Philosophical Libertine* (Leiden: Brill, 1991).

—, *Rose Cross Over the Baltic: The Influence of Joachite Sectarians in Northern Europe after 1586* (forthcoming).

The Place of Religious History in Intellectual History

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I am speaking on behalf of four special interest groups.

The first consists of historians of English religion. In a sense it is ironic that I should try to represent them here, since during the past twenty years there has been a very sharp turn away from intellectual history, which is often regarded in this part of the historical woods as foreign and slightly frivolous. I do not mean to denigrate English religious history, despite its having become exceedingly empirical. Only by means of long and tedious research have we learned, for example, that most Englishmen did not want the Reformation and were unhappy with the changes once they came. Yet certainly it is true that this sort of work is not what intellectual historians do. The fact that I usually call myself an historian of religion is mostly the result of the structure of European universities, where historians of ideas have to travel under false passports issued by larger and more powerful academic governments.

In some ways I feel more comfortable representing my second group, researchers into Jewish studies, although I am using the term quite differently from the way it is understood in American universities and among their counterparts in Britain. Sadly, Jewish studies today is misorganized according to vertical rather than horizontal principles. University lecturers in this field are expected not only to teach, but worse, to be interested in anything related to Jews from Abraham to Zionism, with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 as the Whiggish and inevitable culmination of thousands of years of history. For example, historians of the Jews in eighteenth-century France shy away from meeting with scholars of France during the Enlightenment, and instead prefer to compare notes with historians of German Jewry, of Anglo Jewry, or even of Australian

We have come to realize that the revival of intellectual life during the Renaissance did not involve only the praise of Greece and Rome, but also of Israel and of Egypt as well.

Jewry, and thereby are largely spared penetrating criticism or debate. The result has been that the field of Jewish studies remains at a comparatively low level.

I would prefer instead to see Jewish studies as a sub-group of general history. In the past fifty years, we have come to realize that the revival of intellectual life during the Renaissance did not involve only the praise of Greece and Rome, but also of Israel and (even if in partly fictitious form) of Egypt as well. Gentile historians have largely failed to integrate Jewish studies into their work, not because of any sinister motive, but because Jewish scholars have kept to themselves, studying in separate departments, attending different conferences, and publishing in specialized Jewish journals often shelved in distant reading rooms. In my own recent book, *The Jews in the History of England, 1485–1850*,¹ I try to remedy this defect at least for England, and try to integrate Jewish and general history.

The third group I represent can only be described as 'Popkin Studies'. By this I mean the work of the disciples and admirers of Professor Richard H. Popkin, those who believe that the history of philosophy and ideas can only be moved forward by the introduction of new material to the existing body of knowledge. A good example of this has been Dick Popkin's recent work on the connection between Spinoza and the English Quakers. His archival research in the Friends House Library in London uncovered documents which show a clear link between Quakers in the Netherlands and Spinoza, which make the Quaker biblical scholar Samuel Fisher somewhat more than a man who by chance had Spinozist ideas at exactly the same time.² Dick Popkin's organization of countless

¹ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).

² R. H. Popkin, 'Spinoza, the Quakers and the Millenarians, 1565–1658', *Manuscripta*, 6 (1982): 113–33; idem, 'Spinoza's Relations with the Quakers in Amsterdam', *Quaker History*, 73 (1984): 14–28; idem, 'Spinoza and Samuel Fisher', *Philosophia*, 15 (1985): 219–36; idem and M. S. Singer, *Spinoza's Earliest Publication?* (Assen and Maastricht, 1987), with an introduction and commentary.

Those of us in small countries have no-one to meet in the common room, but lecturers in larger countries often fail to come into the university at all and make use of their opportunities. Our new society could fulfil this need, and benefit all of us.

seminars consisting of people from all over Europe and America working in related fields has immeasurably expanded our knowledge of numerous areas in intellectual history, and I hope that the new society which we are founding will carry on this tradition of such co-operation.

The final sector I claim to represent consists of scholars from small countries speaking strange tongues. Although we do publish in our own languages from time to time, even in our own countries this counts for very little, and indeed is usually not relevant for promotion. In my department of history in Tel-Aviv, many of the lecturers over the age of forty studied in England; those under forty took their doctorates in the United States. We recognize that our intellectual arenas are abroad, and that the languages of scholarship are English, French, and (to some extent) German. We lack the libraries in any case to pursue research in our own countries. A new society for intellectual history

could provide such an arena for scholarship. I think that even scholars from countries large enough to be a world unto themselves could also profit from a new arena. Universities in the West have largely ceased to be a centre of intellectual exchange, in large part because of the introduction of the personal computer. Professors prefer to work at home, away from the distractions of secretaries and students. Those of us in small countries may find that being the only expert, say, in early modern English history in a country of five million carries a certain benefit, but it is ultimately dispiriting. We have no-one to meet in the common room, but lecturers in larger countries often fail to come into the university at all and thus make use of such opportunities. Our new society could fulfil this need, and benefit all of us.

I should like to conclude with a practical suggestion. I think that rather than having only large conferences on general topics, which is often the case with societies of this kind, we should try to sponsor work groups on more specific subjects. The Foundation for Intellectual History, for example, organized a workshop on the Three Impostors at Leiden in 1991, for the purpose of bringing together scholars over the documents themselves to try to understand the problems involved. I think that the ISIH could play a key role in promoting this sort of activity, which hardly finds a place anywhere else.

INTELLECTUAL HISTORY IN DIFFERENT DISCIPLINES

Art History and Intellectual History

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In 'What is Happening to the History of Ideas?',¹ Donald R. Kelley makes a statement

¹ *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 51 (1990): 16 (reprinted in this issue, p. 44).

which could with little modification be applied to Intellectual History as well: 'The history of the arts maintains a modest place in the history of ideas . . .'. This statement is symptomatic of a lack of symmetry which a Society for Intellectual History might help to overcome: the history of art does not count for much in the context of the History of Ideas and of Intellectual History. On the other hand, the History of Ideas and Intellectual History certainly figure most prominently within the history of art.

Art history is an old discipline, to a significant extent inspired by classical precedents. Many of the characteristics of art history as it is

practised today date back to the sixteenth century, and art theory is more than a hundred years older yet. In its long history, art history has, to a greater or lesser extent, always been an interdisciplinary undertaking. This is not to say that all of art can be reduced to phenomena related to Intellectual History. Artistic style, and artistic choices, cannot be completely explained with reference to theories current at the time. None the less, even artistic style has been analyzed with reference to the intellectual and literary culture of its time, perhaps most successfully in the case of studies of sixteenth-century art. The inherent dangers of such undertakings are illustrated in Panofsky's profoundly problematic book on *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism*, in which he attempted to explain the formal characteristics of French Gothic cathedrals in terms of the mental patterns which he saw at work in contemporary scholasticism.

The branches of scholarship associated with Intellectual History, and of obvious use in the history of art, are too numerous and diversified to all be mentioned here. Only some examples will be given. Iconographic studies bring the scholar into contact with disciplines such as history of religion, political history, social history, the survival of the classics, and literary genres such as ekphrasis, and emblem theory.

Art theory was developed from the models of rhetoric and poetry; literary theory is therefore one of the main tools in studying the theory of art, complemented by textual criticism, the history of philosophy, and numerous disciplines which are crucial as much in the study of art as in the study of art theory and which will be mentioned below. The study of the history of art-theoretical terms, an obvious part of the study of art theory, may also be genuinely illuminating in defining the character of artworks of the same period.

The purpose of art can be addressed with notions derived from poetics and rhetoric or from philosophy; with theories of the functioning of symbols; with the tools provided by the theories of psychology and perception, and many others.

The understanding of art as imitation, based on an ancient theory and crucial in art theory from the fifteenth century onwards, led to the development of techniques of representation which are directly or indirectly based on developments in contemporary science. Thus, the history of science has an important place in art history; the history of medicine accounts for artists' anatomical knowledge; the history of mathematics

and applied mathematics provides the background for the development, and the more or less competent use, of linear perspective; colour theory, botany, and meteorology all attracted the attention of at least some artists, among whom Leonardo holds a place of prominence.

Questions of perception with regard to artworks were discussed already in the sixteenth century (in some instances following classical models), and were elaborated into sophisticated theories in the following centuries; the theory of perception remains a vital area of inquiry in art history today.

An important area of study is the transmission of knowledge to artists, their schooling, their training in the studio, the languages individual artists read, the books they owned, or had access to, and the uses they made of such books. Questions of education are similarly crucial with regard to the patrons who commissioned or collected works of art, and with regard to artistic advisers, who were in individual cases asked to devise the iconography of artworks. The history of book production is itself related to art history, since numerous books, both in manuscript and in print, were decorated by artists.

Lastly, the history of art history is obviously dependent on an interdisciplinary approach. Individual scholars' philosophical notions, their access to scholarly traditions, and their approaches to questions of methodology, document yet again the close links between many of the tasks art historians set themselves, and the disciplines associated with Intellectual History.

Intellectual Histories of Music?

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Since at present even the definition of music has become problematic, I may be forgiven for not being able to answer the question: What is the intellectual history of music? Musicology veers between an older generation of scholars who confidently answer the question: 'What is music?' by writing a monograph, and the admission of one the liveliest younger contributors to the field professing: 'I am no longer sure

The traditional perception of vocal music treats music as tautological, as part of a monolithic block, which we either reject or accept, or only understand in a reductionist manner.

what MUSIC is.¹ I shall restrict myself to exploring some of the questions which at present clearly stir the minds of an increasing number of musicologists and sketch three research areas in which the discussion of such questions has already resulted in thought-provoking work without wishing to imply any negative criticism of authors and topics omitted.

1. The first area can be summarized under the question: 'Can we trust music?' It is generally assumed that we voluntarily suspend our disbelief when undergoing aesthetic experiences for the purpose of enjoyment and knowledge. But artists, or at least writers involved with the arts have again and again voiced their concern about the object of this 'disbelief'. According to Hans Blumenberg, the tradition of aesthetic theory can be placed under the umbrella of a historically continuous discussion along the lines of the ancient theme that poets are liars.² Confirmation of a conflict between the invention and disclosure of reality in aesthetic experience comes, to quote one example from Rousseau, when he admonished composers of operas to bear in mind their audiences' fluctuating feelings: 'On doit songer qu'on parle à des cœurs sensibles sans oublier qu'on parle à des gens raisonnables.'³

This raises the questions: 'Which part of reason remains active, when we gain pleasure by suspending our disbelief?' and 'How does intellectual activity relate to the work of art we are experiencing?' Carolyn Abbate has queried the traditional perception of vocal music as simply 'analogous to the event-sequences of theatrical or cinematic narrative'.⁴ Such an approach, she claims, treats music as tautological, as part of a monolithic block, which we either reject or

accept, or only understand in a reductionist manner. She criticizes various musicologists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, who in operatic studies postulated a congruence between text, music, and stage scenery, while they tended to interpret instrumental music on the basis of only one parameter. These methods, she rightfully claims, cannot sufficiently take into account any of the 'cross-currents' and 'multi-layers', which are easily detected in musical structures and all too familiar from both literature and literary studies. But what is a 'cross-current' in a musical composition? and how can it be analysed? Abbate focuses mainly on musical narratives, that is, such moments in a drama when action is interrupted and a protagonist can give his or her view of a past or future event. At this point, the composer has the opportunity to shade the account musically in innumerable ways. He may contradict the voice of the singer, or reveal to the audience through music something the protagonist does not know, and so on. A moral question arises as the composer and, in the second place, the listener has to decide whether a singer rings true or false: 'When narration is allied to music, sensing truth demands doubly acute ears.'⁵ Applying French literary theory, in particular Roland Barthes, to music, Abbate analyses music by Délibes, Dukas, Mozart, Wagner, Mahler, and more recently Richard Strauss as a multivalent structure.⁶

Through her brilliant textual and musical interpretation Abbate makes the reader aware of the many different forms of narrative, from the personal rendering of a story to pure vocalizing without text, as in Lakmé's introductory coloratura from Délibes' opera. She focuses on scenes like this because musical sound here acquires a relative independence from the plot as the voice assails the listener simply by its physical force. Simultaneously, the audience becomes 'aware . . . —painfully, if the high C is missed—that we witness a performance'.⁷ However Jauss's criticism of French structuralist literary theory applies to Abbate: 'The texts remain, as it were, among themselves, separated from their genesis and consequence.'⁸

¹ Carl Dahlhaus and Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht, *Was ist Musik?* (Wilhelmshaven, 1985); Susan McClary, *Feminine Endings: Music, Gender and Sexuality* (Minneapolis, 1991), 19.

² H. Blumenberg, 'Wirklichkeitsbegriff und Möglichkeit des Romans', *Nachmahnung und Illusion*, ed. H. R. Jauss (Munich, 1969), 9.

³ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'Opéra', *Dictionnaire de Musique*, OC, ed. B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond (Paris, 1995), v: 957.

⁴ Carolyn Abbate, *Unsung Voices* (Princeton, 1991), p. x.

⁵ Ibid., 156.

⁶ See also Carolyn Abbate, 'Opera, or the Envoicing of Women', in Ruth Solie (ed.), *Musicology and Difference: Gender and Sexuality in Music Scholarship* (Berkeley, 1993), 225–58.

⁷ Abbate, *Unsung Voices*, 10.

⁸ H. R. Jauss, *Ästhetische Erfahrung und literarische Hermeneutik* (Frankfurt, 1982), 68.

2. The second area can be summarized under the question: 'How can we evaluate historical forms of musical theory and practice when they are alien to our modern culture?' Gary Tomlinson's book *Music in Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others* immediately indicates through its title and subtitle that he, too, is concerned with the historiography of music, but also makes clear that much more is at stake than in Abbate's *Unsung Voices*. Tomlinson criticizes previous Renaissance music historians for concentrating on issues of style and genre at the expense of the investigation the 'hidden premises of past ways of knowing and doing'.⁹ Taking his cues from Foucault's archaeology and the self-criticism of anthropologists (Geertz), Tomlinson revokes the purification of sixteenth-century musical culture tacitly undertaken by previous scholars, describing instead sixteenth-century magical thinking in connection with its musical practice as an endeavour to create magical effects. Tomlinson deserves the highest praise for raising the problem as to how the modern reader can evaluate such alien activities most prominently described in Ficino. However, his conclusion is disconcerting. 'It is not enough to grant that Ficino's musical magic was rhetorically successful as social practice, performance or speech act. Ficino himself clearly placed it also in something like what we today would call a sphere of "techne"; in order not to violate his world construction we must accept it as operating technically as well as socially . . . Our desire to ask is, however, almost irresistible: "But how, precisely, did Ficino's songs work technically?" . . . We must recognise that the voicing itself of the question is an unwarranted act of translation, a forced reshaping of Ficino's world to fit the different shape of our own . . . So we must not ask the question that comes automatically to our lips.'¹⁰

Despite his sophisticated account of the recent debate on 'dialogue' (Gadamer, Ricoeur, Bakhtin), Tomlinson does not in fact carry out such a dialogue with this alien form of thinking but simply enthrones it as a social reality, forbidding his readers any doubts about its status, although this in particular has been contested since the seventeenth century. In a review article Karol Berger is rightly alarmed about the possible political consequences that might fol-

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low from Tomlinson's intellectual attitude: 'What he [Tomlinson] wants is to establish a permanent protected zone, a barrier beyond which we are not allowed to peek. He erects this barrier out of a well-meaning though distinctly condescending and paternalistic wish to protect the vulnerable other from our hegemonic advances and forgets that historically and in our bloody century more than ever, barriers of this kind protected all sorts of others, not only the weak and good, but equally the strong and wicked.'¹¹

3. The third area of research to be sketched concerns a growing group of scholars debating the political implications of music criticism in their attempts to continue the Critical Theory of Theodor W. Adorno. Rose Subotnik, a pioneer in American musicological studies of Adorno,¹² espouses for example Adorno's view that there was an ideal moment in music history at the end of the eighteenth century when the artistic interests of composers and society coincided, to interpret the 'raw' sound of Papageno's flute in Mozart's *The Magic Flute* as a metaphor of the ideal of 'social inclusiveness'.¹³ The moments of unaccompanied sound and the manner of their incorporation into the opera provide Subotnik with the musical element for her philosophical interpretation, which is concerned with the validity of historical ideas in modern society. Subotnik's close reading of sources in her earlier articles has

¹¹ Karol Berger, 'Contemplating Music Archaeology', *Journal of Musicology*, 13 (1995): 127.

¹² See Rose R. Subotnik, *Developing Variations. Style and Ideology in Western Music* (Minnesota, 1991). See also Susan McClary, 'A Musical Dialectic from the Enlightenment: Mozart's "Piano Concerto in G Major, K. 453", Movement 2', *Cultural Critique*, 4 (1986): 129-69; M. Paddison, *Adorno's Aesthetic of Music* (Cambridge, 1993); M. Paddison, *Adorno's Modernism and Mass Culture: Essays on Critical Theory and Music* (1996).

¹³ Rose Subotnik, 'Whose Magic Flute?', in *Deconstructive Variations: Music and Reason in Western Society* (Minnesota, 1996), 33.

⁹ Gary Tomlinson, *Music in Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others* (Chicago, 1993), p. xi.

¹⁰ Ibid., 250-51.

been developed more recently into a critical stance which she adopts towards Adorno's and Schoenberg's ideal of the reclusive, score-possessing, structural listener. This listener's approach to music is revealed not only as being based on a particular musical style and education, but also as lacking 'recognition to non-structural varieties of meaning or emotion in the act of listening. . . . Structural listening by itself turns out to be socially divisive.'¹⁴

This social divisiveness as enacted through music must not be of major concern given the status of music in modern society. It shows itself not only in the dimming lights at the beginning of most concerts, when we retreat into our emotional self to prepare ourselves for the passive 'concert occasion',¹⁵ but also in the difficulty we have in talking about the aesthetic experience of an ever increasing number of musics without losing our identity.

Intellectual History and the History of Philosophy

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Recently, the relation of intellectual history to the history of philosophy seems to be an American concern. I can give two examples. Ten years ago, Richard Rorty wanted the history of philosophy to be written as an intellectual history.¹ Six years ago, Donald Kelley reminded us that intellectual history was nothing more than an offspring of the history of philosophy and that it was never very distant from it.² Rorty argues as a philosopher. He speaks of histories of philosophy written by philosophers who tend to think that philosophy 'owns' its

proper history. Their histories should be abandoned, says Rorty, since we have enough doxographies or 'histories of the peaks'. Rather, we should write 'nitty-gritty' intellectual histories of philosophy and try to see past philosophies within the context of what they meant to their contemporaries. In this view, philosophers are not merely 'holding' opinions, they are not merely theoreticians, system-builders, or writers, but most of all thinkers who must be understood in the intellectual context of their time and place. Rorty urges us to let go any form of mirroring: the history of philosophy should not look back into past and forgotten ideas, but it should give a historico-critical reconstruction of the intellectual dimension of philosophy.

When Rorty says that the history of philosophy is different from intellectual history, Kelley does not disagree. But he emphasizes the fact that the history of philosophy is always needed for whatever form of intellectual history, because what is central to it, namely intellectual or 'spiritual' life, is everywhere implicitly 'loaded' with philosophy. Being an intellectual historian himself, Kelley hints at the fact that historians of philosophy have been around long before intellectual historians, and that they were the first to give comprehensive descriptions of ideas and notions, of conceptions and world views. In this more historical perspective, intellectual history will always overlap with the history of philosophy: be it only because their interests were originally linked.

Not everybody may think today this overlapping of intellectual history and the history of philosophy still pertinent. And of course it can be argued that even if philosophy was taken in a very wide sense as to embrace all the arts and sciences, it could never really demarcate the open fields of intellectual history. The point is, however, that any interest in intellectual history develops from some disciplinary perspective, e.g. from a philosophical perspective, and that, consequently, it must overcome this perspective in order to include it into the much wider scope—however vague—of intellectual history. In any case, intellectual history should never match any history of any discipline, not even that of philosophy. It should be interdisciplinary and international, holistic and comparative at the same time.

What we can learn from Kelley and Rorty and their demand to change the history of philosophy into an intellectual history, is implicitly enclosed in that demand: it is the fact that the narrowing of the historical perspective takes

¹⁴ 'Toward a Deconstruction of Structural Listening: a Critique of Schoenberg, Adorno and Stravinsky', in *Deconstructive Variations*, 170.

¹⁵ Edward Said, *Musical Elaborations* (London, 1991), 11.

¹ 'The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres', in *Philosophy in History*, ed. R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 49–75.

² 'What is Happening to the History of Ideas?', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 51 (1990): 3–25 (reprinted in this issue, pp. 36–50).

place all the time and that the 'discipline-biased' historical reconstruction always imposes itself on any attempt to write intellectual history. Intellectual history seems to be the kind of history which is never quite achieved and which is always critical with regard to established forms of how to envisage the past.

I am not myself sure whether intellectual historians today should keep in mind that what they do developed from the historiography of philosophy, but I do understand very well that intellectual history is directed against conventional forms of the history of philosophy (this is where my own interests lie). I think that the historical reconstruction of philosophy's past times may become important if carried out as an intellectual history, by widening the framework of historical problematization. Rorty tried to do this while criticizing some 'classical' forms of the history of philosophy (doxography, *Geistesgeschichte*, rational and historical reconstruction), whereas Kelley tried to modernize the 'canon' of Arthur O. Lovejoy's 'History of Ideas' (in aiming at general forms of linguistic and cultural self-reflection). What an intellectual history can bring about, both have indicated in many ways which merit to be considered in more detail.

Here I would like to be brief in just adding an illustration of how a disciplinary history changes once approached by an intellectual historian. The disciplinary history in question is of course the history of philosophy, which I know best. In its more conventional forms this history does not consider practices of philosophy teaching. Philosophy is looked at as scientific thinking, as literature, as a way of conducting one's life, etc. Never is there any thought involved of how one reaches the high grounds of philosophical reflection, of how philosophy is cultivated, exercised, and taught, of how one may find a self-understanding as a philosopher. In history books we all know, there is, until today, some concern for different definitions of philosophy at different times, but there is practically no concern for differences in the ways of philosophy teaching—philosophizing as an activity is conceived through 'results', through propositions and systems, taken separately from anything which could be part of their intellectual and social situation. Yet we all know that the book—or, more generally speaking, writing—was never the exclusive expression of philosophy. The schools of the middle ages, the private circles of the humanists, home teaching, and universities in modern times—these are

Intellectual history should never match any history of any discipline, not even that of philosophy. It should be interdisciplinary and international, holistic and comparative at the same time.

forms of transmitting philosophy which tell a lot about philosophy itself; they constitute differences between 'types' of philosophizing which are characteristic of their time. Many philosophers say that thinking is method, but rarely have historians of philosophy tried to address past philosophies accordingly.

Let me be more specific and take for example the nineteenth century, when in German and French universities philosophy was taught as a discipline ('sujet', 'Fach'). Conventional histories of philosophy do not discuss this fact, although ever since, at least in these countries, nobody achieved anything in philosophy without having followed the 'academic' path (this applies also to those who, later on, left this path). What do we in fact know about how universities transmitted the philosophical knowledge? Very little indeed.³ Worse still: not only do we not know what happened when philosophy was institutionalized by the State (think of France and Germany a hundred and fifty years ago), we also ignore the effects of that institutionalization, although we still witness them today. It was during the nineteenth century that the introduction to philosophy was given more and more by means of teaching its history: it became an academic regularity to introduce the student to philosophy by means of books on the history of philosophy.⁴ Conventional histories of philosophy are not only conventional in the sense of usual, they are conventional because they express and support disciplinary and cultural conventions of what it is like to philosophize (just as histories of literature or art express and support disciplinary and cultural conventions of what it is like to be a writer or an artist).

³ Cf. my articles, 'Philosophy Teaching in Nineteenth-Century Germany', in *History of Universities* xii, ed. Lawrence Brockliss (1993), 197–338; 'L'Historicisation de l'enseignement de la philosophie dans les universités allemandes du XIX^e siècle', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 109 (1995): 29–40.

⁴ Cf. my 'Bibliography of Nineteenth-Century Histories of Philosophy in German, English, and French', *History of Historiography*, 21 (1992): 141–69.

Only a non-philosophical or not-discipline-biased history of philosophy could explain the 'intellectual' shortcomings of traditional histories of philosophy. There is a need for more than philosophical understanding to write a history of the cultural meaning of philosophy.

Here we have come full circle, since the fact of the conventionality of histories of philosophy can only be explained by means of an intellectual history of philosophy and its teaching practices. If histories of philosophy which are written by philosophers serve—however indirect—teaching purposes, i.e. the 'definition' of philosophy, they are part of the question, what the history of philosophy 'really' is, and not part of the answer to that question. Only a non-philosophical or not-discipline-biased history of philosophy could explain the 'intellectual' shortcomings of traditional histories of philosophy. Of course there is a need for more than just philosophical understanding to write such a history of the cultural meaning of philosophy: so this is no easy job. But principally, we should think of intellectual history as a perspective always taken from one step further back.

Notes on Intellectual History, History of Philosophy, and History of Ideas

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I wish you saw me half starting out of my chair, with what confidence, as I grasp the elbow of it, I look up—catching the idea, even sometimes before it half way reaches me—I believe in my conscience I intercept many a thought which heaven intended for another man.

(Sterne, *Tristram Shandy*, VIII.2)

I am an historian of ideas, I suppose, even if I am usually rather reluctant to admit it because historians of science and cultural historians—I am surrounded by them—tend to be rather rude about it. History of ideas, they say, is an

enterprise which, for all its scholarly pretensions, is inevitably anachronistic in its concern with the ancestry of present-day doctrines, theories and disciplines, and unremittingly intellectualistic in its focus on concepts and contents rather than actions and practices.

In fact history of ideas remains at the heart of all the humanities, and I believe that it is right that it should do so. Of course, certain precautions are in order.

It must be conceded to the critics of traditional history of ideas that, for all their power, ideas have, as it were, no feet. In order to make history of ideas work we must study the concrete ways in which ideas are written up and read, disseminated, received, appropriated. What I have in mind is, in a way, no longer a history of ideas as such, but of ideas in a more material form, ideas as realized in texts—in fact, a history of books in the hands of people reading them, talking about them, and, perhaps, writing about them, borrowing ways of seeing and feeling from them, and even lifting whole pages out of them.

A well-known example is the dissemination of Locke's 'way of ideas': through different editions of the *Essay* and his other writings (with different paginations, different misprints, etc.), through translations, as well as through epitomes and abstracts, reviews in periodicals, dictionaries in different languages, and through essays, mentions (and sometimes travesties) in novels. Some typical questions I should like to ask are: How would an eighteenth-century reader have first got acquainted with the 'way of ideas'? Or, to put it slightly differently, What would have been his/her most probable means of information about it? How would it have appeared to him or her from their reading of standard sources (periodicals, dictionaries, abstracts, etc.)? How much of it would have immediately struck them as interesting, and how much as new? What would they have perceived of, and how would they have talked about, the 'way of ideas' in the different stages of their familiarity with it? and so on. Behind these questions there is another one, crucial: How do we operate in order to identify a plausible eighteenth-century reader? (For instance, quite a few of them are likely to have been women; most of them would have been, and/or made a point of being, amateurs; did they read on their own, or in company?, etc.) It is evident that such an approach would, among other things, end up not only in critical editions, such as the splendid one of the *Essay* by Paul



Nidditch, but also in annotated and commented facsimile reprints of period editions and publications. Of course, Locke's way of ideas was immensely influential; but this does not make it a uniquely interesting case—think of the dissemination and reception of the Port Royal *Logic*, of Berkeley's works, or of Hume's essay 'Of Miracles'.

On another score, however, the critics of the history of ideas should, I think, be resolutely resisted. A robust history of ideas should not avoid, and has no need to apologize for, taking as its objects authors, texts, and theories that are still of interest from a theoretical point of view. This obviously poses some particular problems—the most obvious one being that theoretical interpretations are for the most part misreadings from a historical point of view. But it is worth remembering that these are not specific to historians of ideas, of the sciences, and of philosophy; we share them with, say, the historians of the arts and of music. Some creative appropriations may be irritating, even infuriating. And yet they are also a challenge, and a challenge worth taking up: the attention of philosophers lends our historical work an edge often absent from other areas of history. So not only may philosophers profit from the company of historians of ideas—the reverse is also the case.

The persistent theoretical interest in some figures or doctrines is not only a source of irritation and stimulation. Hume's *Treatise* is still interesting for its treatment of causation—which has been read, more or less creatively and interestingly, for two and a half centuries, by, among others, anonymous contemporary reviewers, Thomas Reid, Kant, Husserl, and so on, to Saul Kripke and Simon Blackburn. It is true that being part of such a tradition may well prevent us from having a historically unpreconceived point of view over our object—how can our Hume be really pre-Kantian, or pre-Husserlian, etc.? But then of course it is more than questionable whether such an unprejudiced point of view on a past fact is ever attainable. On the other hand, where the text has been opened up by such a variety of powerful readings, and has thus become a 'classic' in T. S. Eliot's sense, our study of, and presence in its tradition may make us more aware of what we are doing and why. I am convinced that such a reformed history of ideas can re-integrate history and philosophy, the respect due to the pastness of a past work, and the moral and doctrinal engagement of present-day appropriations.

A robust history of ideas should not avoid, and has no need to apologize for, taking as its objects authors, texts, and theories that are still of interest from a theoretical point of view.

Intellectual History and Dutch Cartesianism

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My personal interest in an International Society for Intellectual History is determined by my interest in Dutch Cartesianism. The history of this phenomenon is essentially that of the transformation of a non-academic philosophy into an academic philosophy, which means a history of how concepts change through and in the confrontation with the institutional and political (religious) contingencies of a certain period in Dutch history. Moreover, Cartesianism developed into a cultural phenomenon with a strong impact on religion, politics, and literature. I think this makes it an ideal subject of intellectual history and consequently an ideal focus for an international conference in intellectual history.

Furthermore, I have a more general interest in such a society, not only because it allows representatives of small countries to broaden their scope and to find for their ideas a more international audience, but also because a number of Dutch institutions would find in such a society a natural ally. I think especially of the Faculty of Philosophy at Utrecht University, which has a strong section in history of philosophy (programmes concentrating on the editing of texts and their 'reception'), graduate schools in philosophical (the section History of Philosophy) and cultural history (the section History of Ideas) and societies for seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth-century studies.

For anybody connected with these institutions, with all of which I am affiliated, I think an International Society of Intellectual History would be extremely useful.

Finally, I hope it is understood that I am ready to serve the Society in any stage of its evolution, before and after its foundation.

A disquieting tendency has been for certain traditions in the study of 'high' ideas to become institutionalized in their own right. This has had a distorting effect, leading to the neglect of broader aspects of the period. A case in point is the history of political thought, the study of which dominates intellectual history to quite a disproportionate extent.

Intellectual History: Biographical and Archival Sources

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My area of speciality is the history of ideas in late-seventeenth-century England, on which I have published various books; my research has focused on the Royal Society in its early years, and on such thinkers as John Aubrey, John Evelyn, Robert Hooke, and Samuel Jeake. Though in the past I have attempted a general survey of the ideas of the period in my *Science and Society in Restoration England* (1981), I have come to feel that such surveys almost inevitably involve undue simplification. Instead, it has increasingly been my conviction that the ideas of a period like this can only be properly understood by intensive study of the ideas of individual thinkers, preferably involving close scrutiny of the archival remains that they have left us. For that reason, I am myself committed to a sustained programme of research on Robert Boyle, whose extensive papers I am trying to understand and exploit, in conjunction with a new edition of his writings for the 'Pickering Masters' series, which I am currently preparing in collaboration with Antonio Clericuzio and Edward B. Davis.

In parallel with this, I am trying to persuade others to adopt a similar approach, thus encouraging comparisons between different thinkers which should result in worthwhile broader conclusions. To this end I have organized a conference on 'Archives of the Scientific Revolution',

which took place at the Royal Society in London from the 11th to the 12th of April 1996. This comprised a series of papers looking at the archives both of individual intellectuals and of scientific institutions. It has undoubtedly opened up a new dimension on the history of ideas in the period by stimulating questions about how ideas were transmitted, recorded, and reprocessed at the time.

Beyond this, I should like to make a couple of points about the past and future of the history of ideas. My first point is that we need to decide how the ideas that we study are to be defined. Are they all the ideas of a society, or just some of them? In particular, how do they relate to an area of study that has burgeoned in recent years, the study of popular culture? Is our subject matter to be defined as 'unpopular ideas'? I hope not. In fact, as recent work on subjects like demonology by authors like Norman Cohn, Carlo Ginzburg, and Stuart Clark has demonstrated, there is a crucial interconnection between learned and popular ideas, and neither can be properly understood in isolation from the other.

Secondly, it seems to me that part of the difficulty for the history of ideas in general has been the disproportionate attention lavished on specific traditions within it. As for 'high' ideas, a slightly disquieting tendency has been for certain traditions in their study to become institutionalized in their own right. Whatever the positive benefits of this, it has had a distorting effect, leading to the neglect of broader aspects of the period which do not fit into these traditions. A case in point is the history of political thought, the study of which in my view dominates intellectual history to quite a disproportionate extent in some published series.

A similar state of affairs exists with the history of science. Again, a disproportionate emphasis on this has had a distorting effect, particularly in the early modern period, where all too often commentators have misunderstood what we would identify as science by overestimating its significance in early modern intellectual life as a whole. A third instance is the influence of the study of literature, which has had a similar distorting effect due to its obsession with a canon of great names. To avoid such distortion it is essential to try to get away from these rather narrow traditions (which often involve rather anachronistic conceptualizations of the subject), and to study the ideas of the period in their own right. The encouragement of that seems to me a worthy goal for the society.



Intellectual History and Philosophy of Science

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These days few people are happy to be called 'intellectual historians'. Intellectual history has indeed been in the doldrums since the 1960s. It has been charged with all sorts of vices: with 'internalism' and 'intellectualism', concentrating on theories and doctrines, ignoring social context, social uses and forms of association of the learned; with elitism, concentrating on great authors, great works, great canonical traditions, but paying little attention to local traditions, popular culture, and the reception and criticism of works; with 'purism', considering the intellectual content of works as something independent of ways of writing and types of persuasion.

Against this it may be observed that in much of the recent disciplinary history which focuses on the social context, literary form, and reception of works the baby is thrown out with the bath-water: contact with the content of works and traditions is lost. Of course, there are distinguished exceptions to this; to cite just one instance, the writings of Nancy Struever on history of historiography, which combine close reading of rhetorical tactics with fascinating analysis of contents.

The time has come, I think, for a revival of the traditional concern of intellectual historians with the contents of past disciplines. However, I am not advocating a return to the earlier obsession with theories and doctrines. My own view, like R. G. Collingwood's in *An Autobiography*, is that we should focus on questions and problems rather than doctrines and theories. In particular, we should try to uncover the 'scenes' of past inquiries, the ranges of issues that were both real for, and thought worth pursuing by, past philosophers, historians, lawyers, medics, etc. This approach can, I believe, both do justice to past disciplines in their historical settings, and illuminate our present-day disciplines by reconstructing their genealogies.

How one should proceed in the attempt to uncover past scenes of inquiry is a very large question indeed, and I shall merely indicate some of the requisite types of historical work.

In much of the recent disciplinary history which focuses on the social context, literary form, and reception of works the baby is thrown out with the bath-water: contact with the content of works and traditions is lost.

One crucial issue is the placement of past disciplines in past schemes of knowledge, as evidenced in encyclopedias, university curricula, institutional arrangements for the arts and sciences, etc. In this connection it is important to note that, prior to the nineteenth century, study of the disciplines central to intellectual history, namely philosophy and history, was preparatory for study in the higher faculties of Law, Medicine and Theology. Thus in my own work on sixteenth-century Paduan philosophy I have found the key to an understanding of the philosophical issues to lie in the links between philosophy and medicine in the University, and between philosophy and ethics in the private tuition of Venetian patricians by the Paduan professors.

In *The Scenes of Inquiry: on the Reality of Questions in the Sciences* (Cambridge University Press, 1991) I have argued that to grasp past scenes of inquiry we need to look at the entire range of conventions, practices, and strategies that were involved in the posing and settling of questions. This means that we should be concerned not just with logical and rational argument, but with all forms of composition and persuasion. In my work on Galileo, for example, I have argued that rhetoric plays at least as large a role as demonstration in his formation of new scenes of inquiry for the mathematical sciences. Further, it should be noted that literary strategies are by no means all that is involved in the posing and settlement of questions. A whole variety of social tactics, of recruitment of allies and marginalization of foes, is involved, and the modes of production of books and the ways they were perceived and read are of the greatest importance for this kind of disciplinary history. Another area vital for this approach is the history of education. For scenes of inquiry are conditioned by the ways in which the knowledge and skills of a discipline are handed on from generation to generation. It is an outstanding merit of the work of Charles Schmitt that it links the history of education with the history of philosophy in such a way as to illuminate the

The history of medicine is becoming trivial, technical, and insular. There is declining concern with events before 1800, and with ideas, intellectual aspirations, and collective mentalities. If this trend is replicated in other spheres of history, the prospects for intellectual history as a whole must be extremely bleak.

issues which really concerned past philosophers.

In sum, I believe that through concentration on questions the intellectual historian can overcome the divide between context and content, between 'external' and 'internal' history. For such a question-oriented historiography, the coming-into-being and passing-away of disciplines can be understood only through the history of practices—practices of education and learning, of composition and persuasion, of the making and reading of books.

Medicine and Intellectual History

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Although sometimes regarded as a self-contained specialism, adventitious to the interests of intellectual history, medicine has played an integral role in the formation of Western culture. Subjects falling within the traditional scope of medical education are a substantial slice of intellectual history, and those trained as doctors have played an important role in intellectual affairs, extending well beyond the confines of their discipline. Medicine has constituted one of the main avenues for the advancement of higher education and for the creation of an educated élite.

Medicine has therefore been one of the main vehicles for the cohesiveness of European culture, and accordingly it must figure in any project concerned with the balanced appraisal of intellectual history. It is scarcely necessary to provide specific examples to demonstrate the importance of medicine, but the Hippocratic

school in Greek antiquity, Galen in the Hellenistic period, the Galenism and Aristotelianism of the medical schools of the Renaissance, medical humanists and polymaths such as Conrad Gessner, the many doctors participating in the first permanent scientific academies of the seventeenth century or in Parisian intellectual affairs during the Enlightenment or the French Revolution, and finally Freud and Jung in the present century, are sufficient to indicate the futility of excluding medicine from intellectual history. They also suggest that the perspective of intellectual history is fundamental for the success of the history of medicine.

The case for the intellectual history of medicine is unquestionable, but realism forces us to conclude that this subject has not advanced in line with other facets of intellectual history to the extent that might have been expected. This shortcoming is particularly notable in the Anglo-Saxon world. This conclusion is unexpected and perhaps surprising, especially considering that in the course of the last twenty-five years the history of medicine as an academic discipline has advanced from virtually nothing to becoming one of the most fashionable areas of historical research. However, all of this has happened without bringing about a proportional contribution to the field of intellectual history.

Prevailing fashions are now very different from in the past, but from point of view of intellectual history, it is arguable that the situation is no better than in 1960. By that stage the foundations for the intellectual history of medicine had been laid by such scholars as Sigerist, Edelstein, Temkin, Ackerknecht, Rosen, and Pagel, most of whom were then nearing the end of their academic careers. Under Temkin's editorship, the *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* was an impressive vehicle for the intellectual history of medicine.

In the 1960s there was no shortage of recruits wanting to cultivate and indeed expand the broader conception of the history of medicine, which was still at that time in Britain at least dominated by the narrow, technical, and positivistic approach absorbed from the history of science. This next stage in the development of the history of medicine was inevitably influenced by some of the powerful ideological forces of the day, the effect of which was to promote much greater attention to social and contextual factors, and relate the history of medicine to social movements or the wider process of economic and political change. The history

of medicine was thereby brought into closer alignment with cultural history, and it was recognized for the first time as an important, constituent part of historical studies.

The new social history of medicine proved productive, and resulted in much wider appeal for the history of medicine both in academic and non-academic circles. However, social history has ultimately become the vehicle for an approach to the history of medicine that has tended to place intellectual history at a discount. There is indeed now a profound danger that the history of medicine will become a minor adjunct of economic history or historical demography. This reflects a general shift towards devaluation of anything in the history of medicine not reducible to quantification, statistics, or econometric analysis. Such moves towards a scientific construction of historical studies are not founded on success in the intellectual marketplace; they are rather a reaction to outside political pressures, which are causing academics to employ specious means to convince their paymasters of the greater relevance and usefulness of the humanities. The current fashion for the history of medicine is to some extent associated with its utility in pandering to the values of an age dominated by economic and materialistic considerations.

Journals in the history of medicine are therefore coming to look like more parochial ver-

sions of the *Economic History Review*. Instructions for contributors relate to presentation of data, and they assume quantitative methodologies. Postgraduate training, which now exists for the first time on an organized basis, is dominated by economics and statistics, and is likely to contain nothing relating to intellectual history. The history of medicine accordingly displays many symptoms of disease. It is becoming trivial, technical, and insular. It is losing its cosmopolitanism; there is declining concern with events before 1800, and with ideas, intellectual aspirations, and collective mentalities. If this trend is replicated in other spheres of history, the prospects for intellectual history as a whole must be extremely bleak.

The tyranny of the history of science is therefore being replaced by an alternative ascendancy possessing many of the same deficiencies. This trend is eroding the capacity of the history of medicine to contribute to intellectual history. Now is the time for re-establishing the importance of the intellectual history of medicine. The ISIH could be a crucial asset in any mission to prevent the final elimination of the robust tradition of the history of medicine established by Sigerist and his followers, and this new organization will of course unify efforts to protect other areas of intellectual history from suffering the fate that has befallen the history of medicine.

GUEST ESSAY

What is Happening to the History of Ideas?

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Journal of the History of Ideas
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“Terzo principal aspetto è una storia d’umane idee. . . .”

Vico, *Scienza nuova*

The “history of ideas” in this country is now entering its second half-century—at least insofar as its principal vehicle, the *Journal of the History of Ideas*, is just publishing its fifty-first volume. In its American incarnation the history of ideas has been associated above all with the work of the principal of this journal, Arthur O. Lovejoy, his colleagues, his epigones, and some of his critics.¹ Yet *ante litteram* this field of study

Reprinted with permission from *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 51 (1990): 3–25. The article has not been copy-edited to conform to the style of *Intellectual News*, but has been left in its original form.

¹ See the recent critical tributes in *JHI*, 48 (1987), 187–263; the orthodox summary by Lovejoy’s colleague George Boas, *The History of Ideas* (New York, 1969); and my survey of the “Horizons of Intellectual History” in *JHI*, 48, 143–69. Extending that discussion, I offer observations made on the basis of my experience (including the reviewing of over 1000 articles submitted to, and the writing of over 1500 notices of “books received” by, the *JHI*) during five years as executive editor in succession to Philip P. Wiener, who presided over the Journal during its first forty-five years. Thanks to the current members of the History of Ideas Club founded by Lovejoy at the Johns Hopkins University (including Jerome Schneewind, J. G. A. Pocock, and Orest Ranum) for comments on an earlier version of these remarks (as well as more recent warnings and suggestions by Lewis Beck, Allan Megill, Anthony Grafton, and Bonnie Smith). In this connection I should also like to draw attention to a new series of volumes drawn from this Journal (“Library of the History of Ideas,” edited by John Yolton), beginning with one edited by me, *The History of Ideas: Canon and Variations*, including articles by and about Lovejoy and theoretical questions concerning intellectual history.

has had a much longer career and has been international in scope. European scholars, too, have long been practicing *Ideen-* or *Begriffsgeschichte*, *l’histoire des idées*; and *la storia delle idee*; and any comprehensive picture should take into account the larger cultural and temporal horizons as well as the more parochial tradition.

Where should such an account begin? The first problem, according to George Boas, is just what historians are writing the history of, especially since there were, according to his count, twenty-five meanings of the term “idea.” An important question, no doubt, but one which may not yield to direct philosophical inquiry. Over two and a half millennia there has never been agreement among philosophers about what ideas are; and it hardly seems likely that intellectual historians can resolve the problem by coming up with a better definition. For at least three centuries, adopting the conventions of philosophers, historians of thought have been trying to trace the trajectories of such enduring categories of thought and successions of speculative systems that have achieved academic recognition; and nowadays, it seems to me, the result for the “history of ideas” has been to close off rather than to open up avenues of inquiry, discovery, and criticism—and, methodologically at least, to confine it to a culturally impoverished canon. So my focus is not on the history of ideas as a recollection or celebration of what Hegel called “philosophemes” (similar to Lovejoy’s “unit-ideas”) but rather on the historical investigation of the textual and cultural remains of human thought processes, however philosophers may conceive of these.

What is the *history of ideas*? The question, since it concerns a human activity, is more straightforward; but a satisfactory answer must be more indirect, if only because the history of ideas (or intellectual history, which is a better term for the enterprise) is located at the juncture of a number of disciplines. Despite claims for “autonomy”² this field must be approached in

² Leonard Krieger in *JHI*, 34 (1973), 499–516 (and see below, n. 47). Jeremy L. Tobey’s valuable *The History of Ideas: A Bibliographical Introduction* (2 vols.; Ox-

the first instance through these more established disciplines, which permit a more concrete inquiry than the bluntly scholastic and unhistorical *Quid?* of impatient and childlike curiosity. So I should like to reframe the question from the perspective of three of these disciplines, whose intersection has situated the modern field of intellectual history:

1. history (what has the history of ideas been?),
2. literature (how is the history of ideas written?), and
3. philosophy (what should the history of ideas be?).

Of these the first two (the *quaestiones facti*, as Kant would say) may lead to plausible answers about the past and present practice of intellectual history, while the third (the *quaestio juris*) invites more arbitrary and theoretical reflections.

What Has the History of Ideas Been?

The history of ideas has a mixed heritage, but most obviously it appears as an offshoot of the history of philosophy. This is clear in view not only of Lovejoy's seminal work in this country but also of the longer history of the field in its European scope. The link with philosophy has been evident at least since the time of Aristotle's critiques of his predecessors and of particular branches of philosophy which came to form separate disciplines. Aristotelian convention divides these disciplines into "theoretical" and "practical" kinds of knowledge, the first including natural sciences, the second political and moral science; and the histories of these particular areas have flourished at least since the Renaissance. Periodically, this proto-history of ideas associated with the Greek philosophical canon has aspired to embrace an even larger, "encyclopediaic" range and indeed, according to a humanist formula, "all the arts and sciences."³ In the sixteenth century, for example, Christophe Milieu proposed a view of universal history which would include the history of nature, (*historia naturae*, including man's physical environment), the history of prudence (*historia*

"Spirit" (spiritus, esprit, Geist) was the key to the divergence between the history of philosophy and "the richer and more diffuse genre of intellectual history."

prudentiae, including mechanical as well as the liberal arts), history of literature (*historia litteraturae*), the history of government (*historia principatus*), and the history of wisdom generally (*historia sapientiae*).⁴ Chronically, since the Renaissance, a series of "new histories" have followed this encyclopedic impulse toward what would eventually be called "intellectual" and even "cultural" history, and it appears also in the eclectic and interdisciplinary vision of Lovejoy, which provided the theoretical agenda for the *Journal of the History of Ideas* a half-century ago.

Academic convention, since the very founding of the universities, has also operated to impose philosophical—and implicitly or explicitly theological—patterns on the history of thought. Education was the teaching of "discipline" and "doctrine"—literally "indoctrination," as sixteenth-century legislation declared—and the mechanism was that process of institutionalized influence I like to call "magisterism" (with its necessary analogue "discipulism"). By this I mean the literal formation of eponymous "-isms" by the students, or disciples (*discipuli*), attracted masters (*magistri*) of particular doctrines.⁵ On the general level this means the specific disciplines taught, or learned, by "jurists" (*iuristae*), "humanists" (*humanistae*, students of the humanities), and others such; more particularly it referred to the doctrine of individual schools, including as "Thomists," "Averroists," "Bartolists," etc.—not to speak of the "atheists" and "deists" that came to threaten orthodoxy and the ecclesiastical monopoly of learning. The history of philosophy took much of its perspective and structure from the careers of these disciplinary and doctrinal "-isms" and anti "-isms," which reflected the intellectual and generational patterns of a university learning still permeated by "scholasticism" as late as the eighteenth century.

By then, of course, scholars had become

ford, 1975), with its disciplinary rubrics (and interdisciplinary oversights), illustrates the difficulty of maintaining this "autonomy" in practical terms; see my review in *American Historical Review*, 82 (1977), 921.

³ *Methode qu'on doit tenir en la lecture de l'histoire* (Paris, 1579), 550, and Henri de la Popelinière, *Idee de l'histoire accomplie* (Paris, 1599), 267.

⁴ *De Scribenda universitatis rerum historia libri quinque* (Basel, 1556), 244, 186, etc.

⁵ Discussion in D. R. Kelley, *The Beginning of Ideology* (Cambridge, 1981), 136–45.

In diverging from the philosophical canon, the history of ideas not only became alienated from “pure reason” and from “pure ideas” but also became entangled in ideological issues and questions of social value and context.

more reflective, more secular, and more “critical” than their magisterial forebears; and they were making serious efforts to develop a theory of the process of learning. It was in the context of that long, curious, and pedantic tradition known as “the philosophy of the history of philosophy” (*Philosophie der Philosophiegeschichte*), going back to post-Kantian controversies and earlier, that the question not only of the role of history in philosophy but also the proper range of the history of ideas were debated.⁶ Put more simply and conventionally, the issue was whether to follow an “internal” or an “external” method. The first extreme is represented by Kant’s “a priori history of philosophy,” which posited a rational progression pursued by a small academic elite (Leibniz, Wolf, and a few others) to its logical end. “Historians of philosophy naturally limit their attention to the ablest thinkers,” Leslie Stephen observed. “They tell us how the torch was passed from hand to hand from Descartes to Locke, from Locke to Hume, and from Hume to Kant.”⁷ The other pole is the “history of the human spirit,” composed by vulgarizing (and sub-

versive) *philosophes* like A. F. Bourreau-Deslandres and Appiano Buonafede, who wanted to admit factors of psychology, “anthropology,” and even geography and climate into their accounts, in effect (as Lucien Braun remarked) turning the history of philosophy into a history of *mentalités*.⁸ This debate over the proper way to delimit philosophy was in a sense “historicized” by Hegel, for whom the whole character of philosophy—questions as well as answers—changed with “the spirit of the times” (*Zeitgeist*), if not of the people (*Volksgeist*). Put more simply, the opposition was between what Hegel called the “philosopheme” of ideas and a broader, less rationalistic, more contextualized “episteme” (in the terminology of Foucault), and for intellectual historians this methodological problem still exists.

“Spirit” (*spiritus*, *esprit*, *Geist*) was the key to the divergence between the history of philosophy and what Richard Rorty called “the richer and more diffuse genre of intellectual history.”⁹ “Looked at in a certain way,” as Bourreau wrote, “it amounts to a history of the human spirit, or at least a history in which the human spirit appears from the highest point of view.”¹⁰ Throughout the Enlightenment there was a great cosmopolitan discussion of the history of the human “spirit” in intellectual terms (*historia intellectus humani*; *histoire de l’esprit humain*; and *Geschichte des menschlichen Geistes* all referred to this expression of civilization).¹¹

⁶ In a vast literature see especially Martial Gueroult, *Histoire de l’histoire de la philosophie* (Paris, 1984–88), I (“En Occident, des origines jusqu’à Condillac”), II (“En Allemagne, de Leibniz à nos jours”), and III (“En France, de Condorcet à nos jours”); Lucien Braun, *Histoire de l’histoire de la philosophie* (Paris, 1973); Lutz Geldsetzer, *Die Philosophie der Philosophiegeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert* (Meisenheim, 1968); *The Monist*, 53 (1969), no. 4: “Philosophy of the History of Philosophy,” ed. L. W. Beck; Craig Walton, “Bibliography of the Historiography and Philosophy of the History of Philosophy,” *International Studies in Philosophy*, 9 (1977); and above all Giovanni Santinello et al. (eds.), *Storia delle storie generali della filosofia* (Brescia, 1979–), 3 vols. so far. Recent contributions to this literature include Rorty et al., *Philosophy in History*; Peter H. Hare (ed.), *Doing Philosophy Historically*, A. J. Holland (ed.), *Philosophy, its History and Historiography* (Dordrecht, 1985); and Bernard P. Dauenhauer (ed.), *At the Nexus of Philosophy and History* (Athens, Ga., 1987). See also the reviews of this and related literature by H. S. Harris (*JHI*, 51, 115–20).

⁷ *A History of European Thought in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1876), I, 3.

⁸ Braun, *Histoire*, 145. A. F. Bourreau-Deslandres, *Histoire critique de la philosophie ou l’on traite de son origine, de ses progrès, et des diverses Révolutions qui lui sont arrivées jusqu’à notre temps* (Amsterdam, 1737), and Buonafede (“Agatopisto Cromaziano”), *Della Istoria della indole di ogni filosofia* (Lucca, 1766) and *Della restaurazione di ogni filosofia nei secoli XVI, XVII e XVIII* (Venice, 1785). See Hegel, *Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie*, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1940), com. no. 3, “Philosophemes” being rendered in the English translation by T. M. Knox and A. V. Miller (Oxford, 1985), 30, as “philosophical propositions.”

⁹ “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres,” *Philosophy in History*, ed. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge, Eng., 1984), 68.

¹⁰ *Histoire critique*, iii. On the linguistic history of “spirit” see *Spiritus (Lessico Intellettuale Europea)*, xxxii, ed. M. Fattori and M. Bianchi, Rome, 1984).

¹¹ Brucker, *Historia critica philosophia* (1737), 21, on “historia intellectus humani”; A.-Y. Goguet, *De l’origine des lois, des arts et des sciences* (Paris, 1758), on “L’histoire de l’esprit humain”; and K. L. Reinhold, “Über den Begriff der Geschichte der Philosophie,” G. G. Fülleborn (ed.), *Beyträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie* (Zullichau, 1791), 21, on “Geschichte des menschlichen Geistes.”

Both Turgot and Condorcet, for example, celebrated the progress of the “human spirit,” as did their spiritual and (in the epithet bestowed by critics) “spiritualist” successor Victor Cousin and in his own way Hegel, though of course the Hegelian *Geist* was a far cry from the *esprit* of the French philosophes. It would appear, too, that the *Geistesgeschichte* of the present century, and especially the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) of Dilthey, are descendants of the Enlightenment concerns for the human “spirit” in its cultural manifestations and more generally of the “spiritualism” that—“liberated from the Cartesian Cogito,” as Georges Gusdorf has said¹²—was preserved by the philosophical canon from Locke to Hume and Kant and from the Scottish moralists to the Ideologues, nineteenth-century Eclectics, neo-Kantians, and phenomenologists.

Perhaps the clearest expression of the canon of professional philosophy is the tradition of modern “Eclecticism,” which leads Brucker to Baron Degérando and Cousin.¹³ “Eclecticism” meant taking the best of ancient doctrines and discarding the rest, and in effect it formed the philosophical aspect of the modern idea of Progress. Yet following the lead of historians of religion (which in many ways, it should be remarked, provided a model for intellectual history), historians of philosophy also came, by the eighteenth century, to recognize the need to attend to the history of error as well as truth. This was one of the implications of the qualifying adjective “critical,” which was attached to

many histories of philosophy from Bourreau’s *Histoire critique de la philosophie* and Brucker’s seminal *Historia critica philosophiae* onwards. The eclectic method was perhaps best described by Degérando, whose aim, as he wrote in his comparative history of philosophical systems of 1804, was, “by studying the history of different sects, their birth, development, successions, conflicts, and mutual relations . . . to seize upon their oppositions, and origins of their disputes,” and finally to render them “reconciled and mediated” and to display their “harmony.”¹⁴

A more fundamental “criticism” of philosophical orthodoxy came, as so often before, from the rival literary and especially rhetorical tradition. The “linguistic turn” inspired by Renaissance humanists such as Lorenzo Valla became explicit in the work of Giambattista Vico, whose “new science” was directed against the anti-historical and anti-linguistic metaphysics of Descartes, and of J. G. Herder, who offered a linguistically based “metacriticism” of Kantian apriorism.¹⁵ Like Vico and Condillac, Herder assumed that thought depended on the medium of language—with which, therefore, the history of ideas has been inextricably bound up. And this logomachy—this debate over the very essence of the logos—has continued, though only on the margins of professional philosophy; and echoes of it can be heard later in the controversy between the philosopher Lovejoy and the philologist Leo Spitzer in an early issue of the *JHI*. More recently the continued, or renewed, force of the rhetorical tradition—the “New Rhetoric,” as it has been called—has been conspicuous in the various intrusions of literary criticism and literary theory into the practice of intellectual history.

In diverging from the philosophical canon, the history of ideas not only became alienated from “pure reason” and from what Brucker called “pure ideas” (*ideae purae*)¹⁶ but also

¹² *La Révolution galiléenne: Les Sciences humaines et la pensée occidentale*, III (2) (Paris, 1969), 184. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, tr. G. Barden and J. Cumming (New York, 1982), 5, points out that the term *Geisteswissenschaften* originated in the translation of J. S. Mill’s “moral sciences” (“Von der Logik der Geisteswissenschaften oder moralischen Wissenschaften,” book 6 of *System der deduktiven und induktiven Logik*, tr. Schiel, 2nd. ed., 1863). On Gusdorf’s recently completed epic of what he also calls a “history of ideas”—*Les Sciences humaines et la pensée de l’Occident* (13 vols.; Paris, 1966–88)—see my “Gusdorfiad,” forthcoming in the new journal, *The History of the Human Sciences* (1990).

¹³ Santorelli, *op. cit.*, II, *passim*; also Masi Serenella, “Eclettismo e storia della filosofia in Johann Franz Budde,” *Memorie della Accademia delle scienze di Torino*, 11, Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, ser. 5, 1 (Turin, 1977), 163–212. A contemporary example of this sort of naive eclecticism is criticized by Daniel Garber, “Does History Have a Future?: Some Reflections on [Jonathan] Bennett and Doing Philosophy Historically,” in *Doing Philosophy Historically*, 28.

¹⁴ *Histoire comparée des systèmes de philosophie, considérés relativement aux principes des connaissances humaines* (Paris, 1804), I, xv. On Degérando see Gueroult, *Histoire*, 111, 707 ff.

¹⁵ *Metakritik*, in *Sämtliche Werke*, xxxvii (Stuttgart, 1853), 17. Cf. Spitzer and Lovejoy in *JHI* (5, 191–203), and Thomas Pfau’s article on Schleiermacher (51, 51–73).

¹⁶ *Historia philosophica de ideis* (Augsburg, 1723), 295. The term “history of ideas” really stems from this work and was adapted by Vico to his own “new science,” which in one of its aspects he called “una storia delle umane idee,” according to *La Scienza nuova seconda*, ed. F. Nicolini (Bari, 1953), 128 (par. 347);

became entangled in ideological issues and questions of social value and context. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries intellectual history was almost inseparable from the modern doctrine of Progress, especially as expressed in the seminal Baconian scheme, conceptualized in Lockean psychology, enshrined in the French *Encyclopédie*, and advertised in D'Alembert's "Preliminary Discourse," which modernized—and further "humanized"—the Renaissance idea of the "encyclopedia" by including the "arts of commerce and technology" (as indeed Milieu had done). The French connection was further strengthened by Dugald Stewart, who criticized D'Alembert's rigid classification by pointing out the unexpected benefits of modern interdisciplinary exchange—between geometry and physics, for example, between etymology and ancient history, and between comparative anatomy and geology—in the "progress of philosophy since the Renaissance of letters."¹⁷

In the aftermath of the French Revolution the "torch" seemed to pass from the hands of the French; and as Mme. de Staël remarked to Degérando in 1802, "the human spirit [*der menschliche Geist*] which seemed to be wandering, has now arrived in Germany."¹⁸ The history of philosophy was certainly flourishing; between 1772 and 1806 over fifty treatises on the subject appeared, and the flood continued throughout the century. Most important were the great history of philosophy by the Kantian W. G. Tennemann (1798–1819) and the *Ideas for the History of Philosophy* (1809) by the pioneering historian of psychology and protégé of Goethe, F. A. Carus, who repeated the advice, so essential to the history of ideas in a general sense, that the history of philosophy should treat not only wisdom but also error.¹⁹ Carus

also recognized "anthropological [i.e. psychological] history of the spirit of philosophizing" (*anthropologische Geschichte des philosophierenden Geistes*), as well as questions of causality, intellectual originality, the force of nationality, and the role of language.

In these concerns Victor Cousin followed both Carus and Tennemann, whose history he translated into French, and more remotely Brucker, whom he called "the father of the history of philosophy." Carrying out the eclectic agenda, Cousin pursued the "history of ideas" (*histoire des idées, des principes, des doctrines particulières*) in a pure Bruckerian, and Platonic, fashion, and hardly distinguished it from the "science" of the history of philosophy. Yet, following Degérando and Brucker, Cousin also recognized the need to consider "external" as well as "internal" factors, including cultural environment and what he called material "causes." Such concerns, while tending to discredit Cousin's standing in philosophical tradition, does suggest for him a prominent place in the prehistory of the history of ideas, especially in view of his promotion of German, Italian, and British ideas, including the work not only of Kant and Hegel but also of the Scottish moralists, Vico, and Herder.²⁰

Outside of the philosophical tradition it is difficult to define a canon or even informal tradition for the history of ideas over the following generations. In the nineteenth century one can follow histories of particular disciplines, and especially of "literature," which acknowledged "external" as well as "internal" conditions and which, as in the work of Herder, De Staël, Friedrich Schlegel, Christophe Meiners, F. C. Schlosser, and J. G. Eichhorn, proposed to relate intellectual creations to social environment.²¹ So, in a later generation, did literary

... "une histoire des idées humaines" in Michelet's translation (1827).

¹⁷ Stewart's essay, written for the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, was translated by J. A. Buchon as *Histoire abrégée des sciences métaphysiques, morales, et politiques depuis la renaissance des lettres* (Paris, 1820), and it was through the accompanying comments of Cousin (369) that Vico's work first became known in France (and would receive wider dissemination through Michelet's translation seven years later).

¹⁸ Cited by J. T. Merz, *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1965), III, 33.

¹⁹ Carus, *Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophie* (Leipzig, 1809), II, 110: "Die Geschichte der Philosophie darf also nicht bloß *historia sapientiae* sondern auch *historia stultitiae* sein." And cf. Carus, *Psyche: On the Development of the Soul, Part One, The Unconscious*, intro. James Hillman (Dallas, 1989).

²⁰ *Cours de l'histoire de la philosophie* (Paris, 1847), 167 etc., and cf. his translation of Tennemann, *Manuel de l'histoire de philosophie* (Paris, 1827), I, 36, etc.; also Victor Cousin, *les idéologues et les écossais*, Colloque du Centre international d'études pédagogiques, Sèvres (Paris, 1985). According to G. H. Lewes, *The Biographical History of Philosophy* (New York, 1857), II, 7, Cousin's "celebrated Eclecticism is nothing but a misconception of Hegel's *History of Philosophy*, fenced round with several plausible arguments."

²¹ Least known is Meiners, *Historische Verleugung der Sitten, und Verfassungen, des Gesetze und Gewerbe, des Handels und der Religion, der Wissenschaften, und Lehranstalten des Mittelalters mit denen unsers Jahrhunderts in Rücksicht auf die Vortheile und Nachtheile der Aufklärung* (1793), tr. J. Ch. Laveaux as *Histoire de l'origine des progrès et de la décadence des sciences dans la Grèce* (an VII), 7, on "l'histoire de l'esprit

historians such as Lerminier, Ste.-Beuve, Taine, and Buckle. From the Romantic period, too, "cultural history" became a leading concern, especially in Germany, and pursued the human "spirit" into areas of religion, myth, and the fine arts, exemplified by the work of Jacob Burckhardt. By the end of the century "culture" had joined "spirit" as a defining feature of the human sciences and history (*Kulturwissenschaften* and *Kulturgeschichte*), and a host of other expressions designated the practice of intellectual history—"history of thought," "history of civilization," "mental culture and progress," "history of morals," "spirit of rationalism" "intellectual development," and history of particular "ideas."²² With the emergence of the "new history" at the turn of the century the term "intellectual history" also gained currency, and soon afterwards the "history of ideas" (though the phrase itself derived from the work of Brucker and Vico two centuries earlier).

Lovejoy, himself a professional philosopher, was surely familiar with these precedents when he set down his own, extraordinarily eclectic agenda in his introduction to *The Great Chain of*

Being (1936) and more fully in an essay published two years later.²³ What might pass for the history of ideas a half century ago could be grouped, according to Lovejoy, under at least twelve different rubrics:

1. The history of philosophy.
2. The history of science.
3. Folklore and some parts of ethnography.
4. Some parts of the history of language, especially semantics.
5. The history of religious beliefs and theological doctrines.
6. Literary history. . . .
7. What is unhappily called "comparative literature."
8. The history of the arts. . . .
9. Economic history and the history of economic theory. . . .
10. The history of education.
11. Political and social history.
12. The history of sociology . . . [and] *Wissensoziologie*.

In the pursuit of these lines of inquiry, Lovejoy added, what was most neglected was the study of particular ("unit-") ideas—an approach he conceived of, as he recalled later, from his reading of Windelband's history of philosophy, one of Brucker's more successful descendants.²⁴

For Lovejoy the study of these areas was in no sense ancillary to other sorts of historical exploration, and the central concern was not merely a "role for history" in the study of philosophy. On the contrary, he argued, the history of ideas "has its own reason for being," and this reason was self-knowledge—in the sense not only of seeking truth but also of analyzing error, which for Lovejoy meant not only celebrating human cultural achievement but also posing the question looming in the late '30s (and present ever since those darkening years): "What's the matter with man?"

In this way the history of ideas apparently freed itself from the hegemony of philosophy while still drawing on its resources. Although "unit-ideas" might be preserved over time, the history of thought is not "an exclusively logical progress in which objective truth progressively unfolds itself in a rational order." Rather, he suggested, it displayed a sort of "oscillation" between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism

human"; and Eichhorn, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Cultur und Literatur des neuern Europas* (1796), Schlosser, *Geschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts und des neunzehnten, bis zum Sturz des französischen Kaiserreichs, mit besondere Rücksicht auf geistige Bildung* (Heidelberg, 1823), tr. D. Davison as *History of the Eighteenth Century and of the Nineteenth till the overthrow of the French Empire with particular reference to Mental Cultivation and Progress* (London, 1843); also Eugène Lerminier, *De l'influence de la philosophie du XVIII^e siècle sur la législation et la sociabilité du XII^e* (Paris, 1833), 1, xv, especially on the theory of law, "l'histoire d'une des idées essentielles de l'humanité."

²² Among other studies, Goldfriedrich, *Die historischen Ideenlehre in Deutschland* (Berlin, 1902), and Luise Schorn-Schütte, *Karl Lamprecht: Kulturgeschichtsschreibung zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik* (Göttingen, 1984). The terms cited appear in the well-known older works by Merz, W. L. Lecky, John W. Draper, Cousin (English translation, 1832), and others. See also Columbia University, *Studies in the History of Ideas* (3 vols.; New York, 1918–35), including contributions by members of the philosophy department, including Dewey, J. H. Randall, McKeon, and Sidney Hook. In general *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* ("Ideengeschichte"), *Diccionario de filosofía* ("Ideas—historia de las"); Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Die Begriffsgeschichte und die Sprache der Philosophie," *Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Forschung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen*, 170 (Opladen, 1971); Erwin Hölzle, *Idee und Ideologie* (Bern, 1969); Reinhart Koselleck, "Begriffsgeschichte and Social History," *Futures Past*, tr. Keith Tribe (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), 73–91, and Melvin Richter (*JHI*, 48, 247–63), with further references.

²³ *Essays in the Historiography of Ideas* (New York, 1948), 1, first published in 1938; and cf. his editorial statement in *JHI*, 1 (1940), 1–23.

²⁴ Daniel J. Wilson, *Arthur O. Lovejoy and the Quest for Intelligibility* (Chapel Hill, 1980), 230.

A major focus of mainstream history of ideas is still on individual authors (and these authors on other authors—and of course second-order studies of historians of ideas such as Cassirer, Randall, Kristeller, and, extensively, Lovejoy himself).

(between enlightenment and romanticism?), arising from the same kind of non-rational (“sociological” and “affective”) factors which older historians of philosophy—Carus, Cousin, and others—had recognized over a century earlier. On conceptual as well as substantive grounds we can regard Lovejoy’s program as a more or less direct descendant and beneficiary of this earlier tradition of “the philosophy of the history of philosophy.”

Yet Kantian, Carusian, or Hegelian idealism and Cousinian “spiritualism” has continued to weigh on the history of ideas; and as a professional philosopher, Lovejoy was unwilling to make many concessions to the criticisms of historians, who urged greater attention to social “context,” to literary scholars, who emphasized the primacy of language and textuality, or to sociological purveyors of relativism and ideology. Not that intellectual history has been overwhelmed or misled by philosophy; rather it has been the captive of the narrow premises of an earlier (“modernist” as well as “classical”) conception of philosophy, when it pretended to be a legislative force for all disciplines.

In that age of conceptual innocence, “ideas” were pure, under authorial if not always rational control, and communicated without difficulty from intellect to intellect, from mountain top to mountain top (in the image Meinecke used in his *Entstehung des Historismus*—published the same year as Lovejoy’s *Great Chain* and similarly dominated by philosophical values and premises). The valleys and foothills were largely untravelling, or viewed from a comfortable distance; “prejudice” could be overcome by reason; “meaning” was attainable by men of good will and a liberal education; “myth” was on its way out; and in polite society, psychological and ideological forces were under control, or at least could be safely ignored. Lovejoy showed some suspicions of this comfortable view, but skepticism did not figure centrally in his agenda; nor did he attend much to newer issues in continental philosophy in

the wake of Dilthey, Husserl, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. His own magisterial ideas were established, and it remained for his disciples to carry on the tradition. But times change, disciples become masters (if not heretics), old texts are given new meanings, and the history of ideas has itself entered new channels and taken on new forms. “Every philosophy . . .,” Hegel wrote, “belongs to its own time and is caught in that time’s restriction.”²⁵ The same must be true of the history of thought, and with this in mind it seems appropriate to turn to the second question:

How is the History of Ideas Written?

Entering another *fin de siècle*, mainstream history of ideas has passed through a variety of shock-waves, intellectual and otherwise; but except for certain frontier territories and bibliographical details, it has preserved ties with Lovejoy’s pre-World War II vision. The major focus is still on individual authors (and these authors on other authors—and of course second-order studies of historians of ideas such as Ernst Cassirer, J. H. Randall, P. O. Kristeller, and, extensively, Lovejoy himself); on particular texts (usually classical or canonized texts); on ideas, doctrines, theories, systems, and “-isms” of various sorts, usually along national or disciplinary lines; and on traditional questions of periodization (Renaissance, Romanticism, Modernism, now perhaps Post-modernism, etc.). Questions of “influence” (an astrological term, as Lucien Febvre reminded us)²⁶ still loom large; texts are still ransacked for “thought-content” and “ideas,” which are passed—along with Leslie Stephen’s “torch”—from thinker to thinker; and an internalist approach still tends to prevail in the history of particular doctrines or disciplines as well as ideas.

Yet changes there have been, and to suggest their nature it seems appropriate to review current work in terms of the rubrics which Lovejoy set down a half-century ago:²⁷

1. The history of philosophy continues to dominate the field of the history of ideas, and indeed the old canon tied to British empiricism, German idealism, and American

²⁵ *History of Philosophy*, 49.

²⁶ *La Terre et l’évolution humaine* (Paris, 1922), 438.

²⁷ My impressions are taken mainly from the articles received and published by the *JHI*; examples will be limited mainly to those published during the last five years, which will be referred to by vol. no. (46–50 = 1985–89), and a few recent books of interest.

pragmatism.²⁸ Noticeable incursions have been made, however, by mythology and especially by literary criticism and an interest in post-modern (or even “post-philosophical”) ideas. In this connection it seems to be the voice not of Kant, Hegel, Marx, or Freud but rather of Nietzsche—and especially the “new Nietzsche”—that dominates recent intellectual-historical “discourse.” Whence the currency of Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, and other dissenters from philosophical orthodoxy.²⁹

2. Interest in the history of science has if anything increased although the field itself has become independent since Lovejoy’s time and lines of inquiry more technical. It has also become conceptually less naive, through not only the controversies centering on the work of Thomas Kuhn but also considerations of the role of the occult and the imagination as well as the logical and imaginative foundations of “scientific discovery.”³⁰ At the same time the horizons of natural science have been expanded by the attention given to such issues as ecology, gender difference, insanity, abortion, animal experimentation, and other issues which hardly concerned Lovejoy and his colleagues.
3. Folklore and ethnography, though central to the study of “popular culture,” are not

areas which historians of ideas have pursued very energetically, but of late anthropology has come into high intellectual fashion and (in the form of what has inevitably come to be called the “new cultural history”) has likewise extended the horizons of intellectual history.³¹ The writings of Clifford Geertz have had an extraordinary impact on historians, if in a somewhat vulgar form and with the effect mainly of providing a sort of intellectual fishing license in the exploration of human culture.

4. Language has become a central focus of the history of ideas (although “semantics” has been in large part superseded by concern with semiotics, hermeneutics, and American interest in *Begriffsgeschichte*) and this arising from a conspicuous “linguistic turn” taken in recent intellectual history.³² For this Journal the result has been studies in the history of particular terms, technical and otherwise, and even more important, an appreciation of the intellectual as well as technical significance of the history of philology and linguistic approaches to philosophical and political works. The critique of Lovejoy’s implicitly idealistic conception of “unit-ideas” has received practical expression in the linguistic and rhetorical analysis of canonical philosophical texts.³³

²⁸ Of 800 submitted and tabulated papers, those devoted to philosophy constitute 25%, political thought 18%, literature 16%, science 12%, religion 8%, historiography 7%, art and aesthetics 5%, women’s studies 2%, miscellaneous historical subjects the rest. English language topics are dominant, 29%, then U.S. 19%, German 18%, French 14%, Italian 6%, and Latin and Greek 5% each. By periods the ranking is 20th Century 26%, 19th C. 20%, 18th C. 17%, 17th C. 15%, 16th C.–Renaissance 8%, and medieval and ancient 6% each.

²⁹ See, for example, the exchange between Anthony Pagden and Dominick LaCapra (49, 519–29 and 677–87), Allan Megill on the reception of Foucault, and the forthcoming essay on Foucault by Jerrold Seigel. Cf. *The New Nietzsche*, ed. David B. Allison (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), and Martin Jay, “Should Intellectual History Take a Linguistic Turn?” *Modern European Intellectual History*, ed. LaCapra and S. Kaplan (Ithaca, 1982), 86–110.

³⁰ Herbert W. Gernand and W. Jay Reedy on Kuhn (47, 469–85) and Catherine Wilson on the microscope and the occult (49, 85–108). And see Daniel A. Dombrowski on St. Augustine and abortion (49, 151–56), Christopher Gill on insanity in antiquity (46, 307–25), and Anita Guerrini on the ethics of animal experimentation in the seventeenth century (50, 391–407).

³¹ Ivan Kalmar on *Völkerpsychologie* and “culture” (48, 671–90); James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (Cambridge, Mass., 1988); and Aletta Biersack, “Local Knowledge, Local History: Geertz and Beyond,” *The New Cultural History*, ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkeley, 1989), 72–96. See also James McLaverty on Locke and Johnson’s *Dictionary* (47, 377–94), Robert Hariman on “modernity” in Machiavelli’s *Prince*, and especially the controversy over Valla and “ordinary language philosophy” initiated by John Monfasani (see below, n. 54).

³² Katherine M. Wilson on “vampire” (46, 577–83), Mario Orrù on “anomy” (47, 177–96), Jane E. Ruby on scientific “law” (47, 341–59), Gregory Claeys on “social science” (47, 409–31), A. P. Bos on “encyclopedia” (50, 179–98), Stephen Wallech on “consciousness” (409–31), Richard E. Aquila on “class” and “rank” (49, 543–62), and Charles Whitney on Baconian “instauration” (50, 371–90). Also James Whitman on Nietzsche and philology (47, 453–60), John C. Adams on Alexander Richardson and rhetoric (50, 227–47), Stephen Yarborough on Jonathan Edwards and rhetoric (47, 395–408), John F. Tinkler on rhetoric and seventeenth-century philology (49, 453–72), etc.

³³ Cf. Spitzer (5, 191–203). See also Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric* (Notre Dame, 1969); Anthony Pagden, *The Languages of*

5. The history of religion and theology continues in all of its confessional as well as "scientific" forms; it has made a particular impact in its association with the history of science and philosophy—the trinity and religious "meditations," for example, in connection with the writing of Descartes, and the occult side of Newton.³⁴
6. The history of literature (and of literary criticism), in association with the aforementioned "linguistic turn," has done most, for good or for ill, to enliven and to transform approaches to intellectual history in the past three decades or so.³⁵ Yet old patterns of debate persist, it seems to me; and the so-called "new historicism" of the 1980s seems in various ways a (methodologically) conservative reaction to the textualist extremes of post-structuralist criticism, and indeed a return to the sort of literary history practiced by the likes of René Wellek and Lovejoy himself—reading literary texts as expressions or codes of cultural forms (though to be sure in the light, and betimes the obscurity, of more recent intellectual fashions, especially anthropological).³⁶
7. "What is unhappily called 'comparative literature'" is still with us, but the earlier euphoria about its potential seems to have faded. "Ideas" continue to be pursued across national and linguistic boundaries

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Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe (Cambridge, Eng., 1987); and the prize-winning book by Brian Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric* (Oxford, 1988) and John S. Nelson, Allan Megill, and Donald N. McCloskey (eds.), *The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences* (Madison, 1987), with the review by Peter Munz (51, 121–42) and responses by Vickers and McCloskey. Cf. Ian Hacking, *Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?* (Cambridge, Eng., 1975).

³⁴ Margaret J. Osler on Descartes and theology (46, 349–62), Stephen M. Nadler on Descartes and transubstantiation (49, 229–40), and Bradley Rubidge on Descartes and religious "meditations" (51, 27–49).

³⁵ Mark Phillips on Scott and Macaulay (50, 117–33) and Raymond Stephenson on "nerves" in *Clarissa* (49, 267–85). On the historical background of the recent proliferation of schools of literary criticism, see the collection of Joseph Natoli (ed.), *Tracing Literary Theory* (Urbana, 1987).

³⁶ On the "new historicism" there is a large, growing, and polemical literature, theoretical as well as interpretive, most recently *The Historical Renaissance*, ed. H. Dubrow and R. Strier (Chicago, 1988), and the collection on *The New Historicism*, ed. H. Aram Veesser (New York, 1989), and see my remarks (*JHI*, 48, 163) as well as a forthcoming paper on "Historicism, the Old and the New."

but with little concern for a comparative method, and it hardly seems nowadays to merit a separate rubric.

8. The history of the arts maintains a modest place in the history of ideas, and indeed aesthetics has become an object of concern for many scholars interested in the function of imagination in philosophical, scientific, and mathematical as well as in works of art more narrowly conceived.³⁷ In the wake of Heidegger and others, especially devotees of *Rezeptionsgeschichte* (and in general the shift of attention from author to reader, which is the heart of the *history* of ideas), the "linguistic turn" has been accompanied by an "aesthetic turn;" and there are signs of this, too, in recent intellectual history.
9. Economic history seems less threatening than it did in the days of Lovejoy's battles with Marxist, or Marxoid, reductionism in the 1930s, though it has also become more specialized and remote from intellectual history. The history of economic thought has become more specialized, too (and even has its own journals); outside the dogmatic traditions of classical and Marxist economics it has also become more historical—trying to extricate Smith and Marx from their scholastic followers and misreaders and to place them in the larger tradition of moral, legal, and political philosophy, emergent social science, and intellectual history.³⁸
10. The history of education (which has likewise become an increasingly specialized field) is still important, especially in providing the social and institutional frame-

³⁷ Stephen Cassedy on mathematics and literary aesthetics (49, 109–32), James Manns on Scottish philosophy and French aesthetics (49, 633–51, and a forthcoming sequel), and Thomas Christensen on music theory and propaganda in D'Alembert (50, 409–28); also another prize-winning work by David Summers, *The Judgment of Sense: Renaissance Naturalism and the Rise of Aesthetics* (Cambridge, Eng., 1987). On the related question of myth see Stephen Daniel on myth in Mandeville (47, 595–609) and Michael Tager on myth in Sorel and Barthes (47, 625–39); also Hans Blumenberg, *Work on Myth*, tr. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), and the review by William Bouwsma (48, 347–54).

³⁸ Russell Nieli on Adam Smith and "intimacy" (47, 611–24), Norman Levine on Marx and the historical school (48, 431–51), and Jerrold Seigel on Durkheim and autonomy (48, 483–507) as well as D. R. Kelley, "The Science of Anthropology: An Essay on the Very Old Marx" (45, 245–62); also Donald McCloskey, *The Rhetoric of Economics* (Madison, 1985).

work for the generation and dissemination of ideas.³⁹

11. The idea of putting ideas in political and social (externalist) "context" has become commonplace in the past generation, as "intellectual history" has tended to supplant the classical "history of ideas" and as historians of literature, especially the "new historicists," have rediscovered this old problem. It has been in the history of political thought in particular, it seems to me, that the dilemma of text-and-context has been most directly confronted; and here again the primacy of language—or rather the discrimination of a variety of political and social languages—has been apparent.⁴⁰
12. *Wissensoziologie* has surely entered eclipse, except as a phase of the "cultural crisis" or the "crisis of historicism" of this century and a general awareness of the "social framework of knowledge"; but the predicament it reflected and the questions it posed have no less surely been absorbed into the enterprise of intellectual historians. In the past generation, as the "new" economic and social histories have been overshadowed by the "new" cultural history, it might be less appropriate to speak of the "sociology of knowledge" than, with K. O. Apel, of the "anthropology of knowledge."⁴¹

There are other categories that could be added to—but, I suppose, equally well subsumed under—Lovejoy's original dozen. Among these I would note, first, the application of quantitative methods to the study both of texts (lexicography fortified and extended by computer programs) and of "influence" (one of Lovejoy's favorite concepts);⁴² second, the ex-

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pansion of historiography to include not only ideas in historical literature but the examination in effect of intellectual traditions and canons in which ideas, or at least verbal conventions, have been preserved; third, the acknowledgment of the epistemological and ideological force of race and gender (as well as class) differences;⁴³ and fourth, the extension of the intellectual historian's horizons to include not only concepts but also questions of "canon-formation," unconscious attitudes, and unexamined "foreknowledge," corresponding perhaps to what Lovejoy himself called "affective" notions and "endemic assumptions." To judge from such aspirations, efforts, and methods, the "new intellectual history" involves not only a certain criticism of Lovejoy's own "endemic assumptions" or (in his own phrase) "unconscious mental habits" but also, and more importantly, an extension of Lovejoy's original encyclopedic and eclectic vision in a quite Lovejovian spirit. Which brings us to the third and last question:

What should the History of Ideas Be?

A presumptuous question, no doubt, but I pose it in a practical rather than prescriptive spirit. In the first place, I think, the history of ideas should represent itself as (according to recent convention) "intellectual history," if only to lay to rest the ghosts of antiquated idealism and to set aside, at least for historical purposes, the imperialist aspirations and invidious claims of philosophy to be a "rigorous science" (in the phrase of Husserl).⁴⁴ Intellectual history is not "doing philosophy" (any more than it is doing literary criticism) retrospectively; it is doing a kind, or several kinds, of historical interpretation, in

³⁹ Martin Staum on political science in the French Institute (48, 411–30); also Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, *From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), with a forthcoming review-article by Robert Black in *JHI*.

⁴⁰ Anthony Pagden (ed.), *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe* (Cambridge, Eng., 1987); David Boucher, *Texts in Context* (Dordrecht, 1985); and James Tully, *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics* (Princeton, 1988).

⁴¹ *Transformation der Philosophie* (Frankfurt, 1976), 1, 35; and see Wolf Lepenies, *Between Literature and Science: the Rise of Sociology*, tr. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge, Eng., 1988).

⁴² See the exchange over quantitative and qualitative approaches to "keywords" between Daniel T. Rodgers and his critics, Mark Olsen and Louis-George Harvey (49, 653–76).

⁴³ Nadia Margolis on Christine de Pizan (47, 360–75) and G. J. Barker-Benfield on Mary Wollstonecraft (50, 95–115).

⁴⁴ "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," *Logos*, 1 (1911), 289–341, with a critique of Dilthey over the meaning of "spirit" and a severe indictment of what Husserl called *Historicismus*. The *JHI* did adopt a subtitle, "An International Quarterly devoted to Intellectual History."

which philosophy and literature figure not as controlling methods but as human creations suggesting the conditions of historical understanding. In this spirit we might do well to recall the words of John Dewey: "The material out of which philosophy finally emerges is irrelevant to science and to explanation. It is figurative, symbolic of hopes and fears, made of imagination and suggestion, not significant of a world of objective fact intellectually confronted. It is poetry and drama rather than science, and is apart from truth and falsity, rationality or absurdity of fact, in the same way that poetry is independent of these things."⁴⁵ Such a human (and humanist) view seems appropriate as well for the history of ideas.

The contrast between the pursuit of propositional entities called "ideas" and the study of language, discourse, and other cultural expressions may be understood by analogy with contrasting conceptions of the history of religion (a field which has always served as a model for the history of thought). According to the Protestant view, such a history was in effect the celebration of "transcendent," unchanging doctrine beyond language, psychology, institutions, or social context, while the orthodox position defended doctrines as "immanent" and so accessible only through corruptible "human traditions" and forms of expression.⁴⁶ It seems to me that intellectual historians cannot reach for the transcendent and pure truth of Protestant spirituality, which has persisted in the modern philosophical canon and Kant's "apriori history of philosophy" (as well as in many conventional histories of political and scientific thought). Rather they must be content with those local and variable expressions of human discourse and behavior which Protestant thinkers, from Luther and Melancthon to Kant and Hegel, so despised.

In the broadest view, then, intellectual history need not (or need no longer) be identified with the canon of philosophy, with the subject-matter of high culture, with elitist social constrictions, or with intellectualist theories of causation in history. Rather it should be seen as an approach, or range of approaches, to historical investigation and interpretation in general—approaches which begin with the study of cultural

and linguistic forms but which do not necessarily presume the conventions of academic or even formally logical discourse. The subjects of intellectual historians are texts, or their cultural analogues; the "intelligible field of study" more generally is language, or languages; and the history of philosophy is not the model of but rather a province in this larger arena of interpretation. In a sense this may be what Lovejoy intended, but his professional baggage (and, perhaps, spiritualist heritage) prevented him, it seems to me, from realizing the larger (as well as the smaller) historical and human potentials of his vision.

There are at least two ways of considering the canon of intellectual history in relation to the older disciplines—one inclined toward disciplinary autonomy, the other toward a kind of methodological supremacy. The weak argument is that, while "ideas" may belong in the domain of philosophy, the "history of ideas" has a different character and so presumably a different heritage, which is associated with historical and literary studies and rhetoric in a general sense. The stronger argument—which accommodates both a "role for history" in philosophy and a role for philosophy in history—is that the "linguistic turn" and the "destruction of metaphysics" (from Nietzsche to Heidegger) represent not just an invitation to literary "deconstruction" but a stage in what has been called the "modern project to rigor" (from Descartes to Nietzsche) within the philosophical tradition itself.⁴⁷ I take Nietzsche's hermeneutical arguments not only to express this sort of critique of philosophy but also to suggest the necessary grounds for the "modern project" of intellectual historians, which includes the accommodation of the history of philosophy. "The interpretive character of all that happens" was the premise of this critic of the philosophical canon.⁴⁸ "There is no such thing as an event in itself. What happens is a group of phenomena *selected* and concentrated together by an interpreting being. Interpretation, not explanation. There is no such thing as a fact, everything is in flux, ungraspable, elusive; what is most enduring is our opinions. Introduction of meaning—in most cases a new interpretation over an old interpretation that has become incomprehensible, that is now itself only a sign."

In any case, to continue these prospective

⁴⁵ *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York, 1920), 33.

⁴⁶ Peter Fraenkel, *Testimonia Patrum* (Geneva, 1961); and cf. the symptomatic, or paradigmatic, *Catalogus testium veritatis* (Basel, 1556) by the founder of Lutheran (and of the modern canon of) hermeneutics, Flacius Illyricus.

⁴⁷ Patrick Madigan, *The Modern Project to Rigor: Descartes to Nietzsche* (Lanham, Md., 1986).

⁴⁸ Nietzsche, *Nachgelassene Fragmente*, cited by Lepenies, *op. cit.*, 100.

suggestions (which represent in a sense extensions of Lovejoy's agenda), intellectual history focuses not on putative behavioral, social, economic, or political "causes," or on an eclectic combination of such, but on the creations of human culture and on human interpretations of that culture. This means (as Lovejoy preached, if not always practiced) attending not only to concepts and rational arguments but also to the other layers of linguistic meaning—and indeed this is the justification for applying to the rhetorical as well as to philosophical traditions in historical interpretation, since rhetoric, and its extensions in modern literary criticism, reveals the resources, structures, and perhaps cultural memories preserved by language (topoi, tropes, metaphors, constructions, analogies, connections, etc.), popular as well as literary, beyond, or beneath, the reaches of logical formulation, or at least of narrowly rational argument and "reasoned history."

Yet the "return to literature," though it has undermined the hegemony of philosophical orthodoxies, has, from the standpoint of historians, produced its own distortions. A recent exchange on intellectual history in this literary connection focuses, characteristically, on the theories and discourse of the current textualist canon, centering especially, for historians who follow such things, on Derrida, Foucault, Hayden White, and Dominick LaCapra (though all too seldom on the more fundamental German antecedents of these more derivative writers).⁴⁹ In his thoughtful and provocative essay David Harlan concentrates appropriately on the questions of text, context, and authorial intention, which are indeed crucial to the task of the intellectual historian. His main targets are "the dream of authorial presence," as he calls it, and historical "contextualism" and its chief proponents, who are J. G. A. Pocock, Quentin Skinner, and David Hollinger. Harlan's arguments concerning what Paul Ricoeur has called the "semantic autonomy of the text" and the inac-

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cessibility of "context" apart from texts are well taken and perhaps logically unassailable. Yet, as Hollinger remarks in his response, these reflections remain on the level of literary theory—in effect a report on the consequences of the (not necessarily critical) importation of doctrines into historical discourse—and they seem to me at best tangential to the current practice and to the hermeneutical condition of intellectual history.

The questions are complex, and I limit myself to two comments. The first is that the problem or (as literary critics used to say) the "fallacy" of intentionalism pertained originally, over a generation ago, to the interpretation of literary texts and their ambiguities and especially to the nature of poetical meaning.⁵⁰ Archibald MacLeish's aphorism (since become a cliché) that "a poem should not mean but be" exemplifies this insight, which became a premise of literary criticism in its own rise to hermeneutical independence and even hegemony. Meaning is related to reading and "reception" as well as writing; but it should be recalled that "reception theory" (or *Rezeptionsästhetik*) arose in a primarily aesthetic context.⁵¹ It was concerned with the enrichment of meaning, in effect the deliberate creation of new meaning, and is not, without qualification, directly applicable to historical (and certainly not to "documentary") sources. What is more, the premise of authorial intention is unavoidable—a necessary fiction at least—in "disciplinary histories" such as the history of science or of political thought (Skinner's and Pocock's own primary domain), which are important branches of intellectual history.⁵²

⁴⁹ Harlan, "Intellectual History and the Return of Literature," including an exchange with David Hollinger and discussion by Allan Megill and others on what is vaguely called the "new history," *American Historical Review*, 94 (1989), 581–698; also Lloyd S. Kramer, "Literary Criticism and Historical Imagination: The Literary Challenge of Hayden White and Dominick LaCapra," *The New Cultural History*, 97–128, *Post-Structuralism and the Question of History*, ed. D. Attridge, G. Bennington, and R. Young (Cambridge, Eng., 1987), and Hans Kellner, *Language and Historical Representation: Getting the Story Crooked* (Wisconsin, 1989).

⁵⁰ K. Wimsatt, Jr., *The Verbal Icon* (Louisville, 1954), 37, and later discussions.

⁵¹ Robert Holub, *Reception Theory* (London, 1984).

⁵² Loren Graham, Wolf Lepenies, and Peter Weingart (eds.), *Functions and Uses of Disciplinary Histories* (Boston, 1983).

We cannot ignore the fundamental criticisms of old-fashioned "historicism" made by phenomenology (and largely forgotten by the "new historicists"), which warns us against the illusions—reinforced by a long tradition of rhetoric, devices of imaginative reconstruction, and the conventions of tense—of a direct "dialogue" with the past.

More complex still, and still less amenable to purely theoretical debate, is the question of "context."⁵³ Harlan calls the constitution of context a "poetic act"; and following LaCapra, he suggests that context requires the control of an indefinite variety of textual networks. This view by no means relies on the assumption of a generalized "climate of opinion" (in the phrase of Joseph Glanvil adopted by Lovejoy) in which influences can be intuited, or of a spiritual forum in which ideas are endlessly debated. Rather it urges that intellectual history, like other varieties of historical study, must be in the first instance the result of well-posed questions of a limited number of texts and aimed at a sort of historical meaning further limited by the language, technology, and social and political conditions of an age—insofar, of course, as they are (textually) determinable. "Context" suggests a problem not wholly amenable to theoretical arguments; it is rather a function of scholarship and of a probable, interpretive, and even (informedly) imaginative reconstruction that cannot be verified absolutely or achieved totally. Context must be established not simply by logical considerations but by something like Gadamer's "experience of tradition" and by a sort of critical and probabilist *heuristics* which inquires into the variety and validity of sources and how—imaginatively—to employ them.

A central, current, and long-standing question in the interpretation of texts has to do with the meaning of "meaning," in a historical sense. Should one read a work merely as an exercise in literal exegesis—paleography, *Quellenforschung*, and reconstruction of authorial intention? Or should one consider the meanings acquired in later contexts remote from, or alien to, the "original" import? Texts have their author-

⁵³ On which see above n. 40.

ity, but they also (according to the classical aphorism) "have their fortune"; and this, too, must be the quarry of intellectual historians.

These extremes might be illustrated by two recent *JHI* articles, one by John Monfasani protesting the characterization of Lorenzo Valla as an "ordinary language philosopher," and the other by Robert Hariman celebrating "Modernity in Machiavelli's *Prince*."⁵⁴ Hariman is concerned with the aspects of Machiavelli's unconventional writing which resonate with modern predicaments, while Monfasani looks to a critical edition of Valla as the answer to all questions about "meaning." In fact Monfasani scores telling points (which Valla would have deeply appreciated) off the interpretations by Richard Waswo and Sarah Gravelle in this recent exchange. Yet these small victories are based on an extremely conservative, perhaps naive, notion of authorial intention and on a curious neglect, or innocence, of the problem of the potential, implicit, and changing meanings of texts in a larger linguistic context and a longer intellectual tradition extending beyond the author's original horizons and immediate intentions. Whether or not intellectual historians can achieve the first aim, they can hardly avoid considering the second; for if there is one lesson to be learned from recent literary theory (not to mention the old tradition of rhetoric), it is that discourse is a two way process, the readerly as well as the writerly—and that the former aspect may be, for intellectual historians, the most "meaningful." In any case the divorce, or rivalry, between the search for the pristine author and his or her afterlife (between the "historical Jesus" and the history of Christianity or, in Vichian terms, between philology and philosophy) is unproductive for the purposes of intellectual historians.

What are the conditions, today, of the relations between intellectual history and the parent disciplines of philosophy, literature, and history? The interdisciplinary orientation of the field surely must be kept; but it is essential for

⁵⁴ Hariman (50, 3–29) and Monfasani, Waswo, and Gravelle (50, 309–36). That the history of scholarship is making a rapprochement with intellectual history is shown by three fine recent studies: Anthony Grafton, *Joseph Scaliger, A Study in the History of the Classical Tradition*, 1 (Oxford, 1983), John D'Amico, *Theory and Practice in Renaissance Textual Criticism: Beatus Rhenanus between Conjecture and History* (Berkeley, 1988), and William McCuaig, *Carlo Sigonio: The Changing World of the late Renaissance* (Princeton, 1989).

historians to be clear, or at least current (as Lovejoy was in his day), about the status of these parent disciplines, since they establish the conditions of knowledge, of expression, and of the interpretation of evidence in a general way. Intellectual history cannot fruitfully tie itself to the outmoded assumptions and issues of the academic and "spiritualist" traditions of yesterday—philosophical, literary, or historical—in the effort of raising the ghosts of yesteryear. Lovejoy himself tried to come to grips with Freud and Mannheim (as well as Marx), and we should do no less (and no less critically) for the intellectual movers and shakers of our times. We cannot return to the age of conceptual innocence before the cultural, social, and political expressions of "affective" and destructive forces of the last half-century, of the world of thought before the linguistic turning, the information explosion, and the experiences projected by means and media which hardly figured in Lovejoy's prescriptions for the history of ideas. We cannot behave as if Husserl, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, and their interlocutors had never written, even if we do not share their views of human thought and expression. Philosophy may not have "ended," but its "career" has been fundamentally changed by alien forces, experiences as well as "ideas"; "metaphysics" may be surpassed, but the search for a "metalanguage" continues; "deconstruction" may be basically an extension of philosophical skepticism and Heideggerian (and Nietzschean) "destruction," but it has enlarged our awareness of the problems of reading as well as writing; "post-modernism" may be a modernist illusion,⁵⁵ but it has become part of our language and experiences, if not doctrinal commitment. God may not be dead, but in recent times She has displayed a variety of unfamiliar faces.

This means, among other things, that we cannot avoid the implications of the linguistic turn, which denies us the possibility of getting "behind the back of language," in Gadamer's words, to pure ideas or philosophemes. We cannot accept uncritically the notion of an autonomous subject, or sovereign author, who operates beyond the restrictions of language and culture. We must reject a simple equation between meaning and authorial intention not

only because of the intimidating force of language and rhetorical tradition but also because intellectual history is at least as concerned with the reading as well as the writing of texts—the reception and distortion as well as creation and transmission of ideas and culture. We cannot ignore the fundamental criticisms of old-fashioned "historicism" made by phenomenology (and largely forgotten by the "new historicists"), which warns us against the illusions—reinforced by a long tradition of rhetoric, devices of imaginative reconstruction, and the conventions of tense—of a direct "dialogue" with the past.⁵⁶ Nor, finally can we, in pursuit of meaning, dispense with notions of gender, class interest, and political commitment, which are embedded in language and which link language with life.⁵⁷

Yet what phenomenology has taken away hermeneutics has to some extent restored, and within the cultural and temporal horizons of our understanding and the insights of the modern "project to rigor," our enterprise remains historical rather than literary or philosophical. It seems to me that too much recent intellectual history (White, LaCapra, et al.) has been spent, often in rather amateurish way, indulging in literary theory, affecting to address questions of high philosophical import, in following the urge toward surreptitious or surrogate ideological fashions, and perhaps (with Harlan) finding intellectual history at a conceptual "impasse." The enticements of postmodern theories and the siren song of "cultural criticism" have distracted scholars from their proper work and their own traditions—which are not as negligible nor as disposable as enthusiasts for recent theories assume. What I should like to see restored to the study of intellectual history is a historical project comparable to the "conception of rational enquiry as embedded in a tradition" which Alasdair McIntyre has, for his own purposes, recently recommended.

This is not to recommend a return to facile eclecticism, nor is it to say that intellectual history is condemned to a passive and falsely "objective" or "disinterested" posture; but it is to suggest that any contemporary significance cannot be produced from a condition of dependence on the fields of philosophy or litera-

⁵⁵ See Wolfgang Iser, *Unsere moderne Postmoderne* (Weinheim, 1987), and the amusing article he cites by Klaus Laerman, "Lacan und Derrida: Über die Frankolatrie in der Kulturwissenschaften," *Kursbuch*, 84 (1986), 34–43.

⁵⁶ A useful collection on the *Historismusstreit* is Franco Bianco (ed.), *Il Dibattito sullo storicismo* (Bologna, 1978).

⁵⁷ See forthcoming collection of *JHI* articles on "Race, Gender and Class" ed. M. Horowitz in the "Library of the History of Ideas" series.

ture—any more than on the various social sciences. Intellectual history has its own aims, values, and questions to pose about the human condition; and these cannot ultimately be honored and pursued on the level of theory, which, distracted by the conversations of neighboring disciplines, tends to neglect the practical problems of its own historical craft. Intellectual history should indeed be concerned with human self-understanding and perhaps (in the light and heat of more recent sensibilities about class, gender, race, and other elements of a “postmodern” condition) make contributions

to the question which Lovejoy posed in connection with his original agenda—“What’s the matter with man?”⁵⁸ My hope is that, with awareness of these new conditions and horizons, intellectual historians will turn more directly to their own tradition and practice, yet with awareness of and attention to the questions appearing on the horizon of our own age—an age not only of *fin de siècle* but also of a new millennium.

⁵⁸ Lovejoy (see above, n. 23).

CALL FOR PAPERS—BERLIN 1998

The History of Endings / The Endings of Stories

We shall witness the ending of a century and a millenium soon, but clearly the topic of historical endings is much more complex and interesting to intellectual historians than just because of this date. At first sight it seems pointless to set up any systematic or topological approach to ‘ending’ phenomena. That something is ending seems to be an observation one can make in many places and instances. In order to envisage the topic of ending in an interdisciplinary perspective, it is important to neglect none of its cultural, political, historical, and existential dimensions. The aim of the 1998 ISIH conference is to bring together as many aspects of endings as possible and to illuminate all the different meanings the term bears in the various disciplines.

Without a doubt one cannot talk about an absolute ending nor about an absolute beginning without running straight into dialectical difficulties. But it is possible to focus on ideas of endings, which play an important part in historical, political, and philosophical thought. The ideas of the world coming to an end, for example, range from the Deluge to the dying forests. This is just one suggestion how to go about dealing with endings; the ‘ending of the world’ topic clearly challenges theologians, philosophers, and political thinkers. Another suggestion is to work out the existential dimension in addressing phenomena of dying and death. Here also medical theory and practice

Wir werden bald Zeugen vom Ende eines Jahrhunderts und eines Jahrtausends sein; aber das Phänomen des Endens ist viel schillernder, als daß es nur durch das nahe Datum 2000 interessant würde. Eine systematische und vollständige Behandlung des Themas verbietet sich von selbst—wer könnte die Vollständigkeit aller Ende bestimmen, ohne selbst jenseits dieser Marke zu stehen? Aber das Phänomen des Aufhörens erscheint allerwegen. Grund genug, sich mit dem „Enden“ in kultureller, politischer, historischer—vielleicht auch existentieller Hinsicht zu beschäftigen. Das ist eine Aufgabe innerhalb und zwischen den akademischen Disziplinen. Das Ziel dieser Konferenz der ISIH ist es, eine Vielzahl von Facetten dieses Themas aus der Perspektive unterschiedlicher Disziplinen zu erhellen.

Es ist evident, daß man über das Thema des absoluten Endes ebenso wenig wie über das den absoluten Anfangs reden kann, ohne unmittelbar in dialektische Probleme zu geraten. Diesseits dieser Schwierigkeiten ist es gleichwohl möglich, die Phänomene vom Enden in historischen, politischen und philosophischen Kontexten zu beschreiben. Die Idee etwa vom Ende der Welt reicht von der Sintflut bis zum Waldsterben. Auch wenn das nur ein Beispiel dafür ist, welchen Vorstellungreichtum das „Enden“ eröffnet—diese Frage gehört gewiß zu den Themen, die Theologen, Philosophen und politische Denker herausfordern. Ein anderes



may come into consideration as well as social relations of all sorts, such as medical ethics and age politics.

Supposing that something has come to an end and becomes obsolete is in itself a relevant phenomenon, one so to speak of a second order. Whatever was deemed 'overcome', 'obsolete', 'not up to date', 'pre-modern' was also dealt with practically, sometimes by replacing it with something 'new', sometimes simply by forgetting about it. There are stories to be told of demolition, of destruction (of deconstruction?), of iconoclastic and anti-clerical movements, of the fading out of the fashionable, etc. The history of social institutions and of human behaviour could tell more about this. Political and social history in return are challenged by what we call revolutions, transformations of culture. Ending is not just the reverse side of new beginnings, but rather the part of any history that even historians usually care least about.

In a narrower sense the topic of endings is about the loss of legitimation, especially political legitimation. The history of constitutions shows that there always was a time when some older forms became less credible and consequently less vigorous. How could we explain this phenomenon of political history? How should we tell the endings of the Roman Republic, of the *Ancien Régime*, of the Holy Roman Empire, of modern monarchies? How do endings occur in the political sphere? Twentieth-century experience should not be excluded from intellectual history here, namely fascism, 'national socialism', and communism. Is liberal democracy in Europe the final winner in constitutional history, or just the present survivor?

A traditional approach to the topic of endings is through the history of art. How and why do styles change? How and why do dominant forms become out of date, in architecture, in painting, in music, and so on? There was a time a couple of decades ago when intellectual conversation was fascinated by the ending of literary genres like the novel, the drama, or other forms of art. This fascination seems to be a recurrent feature of modernity. Do we still feel it is? Or has the interest in bringing things to an end itself ended?

Thema vom umfassendem Interesse ist die existentielle Dimension des persönlichen Endens, von Sterben und Tod. Hier sind medizinische und medizinethische, gerontologische und alterpolitische Probleme impliziert.

Wenn man sagt, etwas sei „am Ende gekommen“, etwas sei überholt, altmodisch und nicht mehr in seiner Zeit, dann impliziert das fast immer, daß die Existenzberechtigung des Alten in Frage gestellt ist. Häufig soll das Alte durch Neues ersetzt werden; manchmal wird das Alte, das zu Ende gekommen ist, auch schlicht vergessen. Es ist wichtig, auch die Geschichten vom Abreißen und Zerstören, von Bilderstürmerei, von ideologischer Symbolvernichtung, von der Zerstörung heiliger Plätze, Kirchen, Moscheen, Klöster, mitzubedenken. Die politischen und die Sozialgeschichtler sollten in der Lage sein, die Bewußtseinsveränderungen zu beschreiben, die zum Wandel des Stilbewußtseins bis hin zur radikalen und revolutionären Beendigung des Alten führen. Enden ist nicht nur die Kehrseite des Anfangens, sondern meistens die Seite der Geschichte, um die sich auch Historiker am wenigsten kümmern.

Das Thema des Endens handelt in einem politischen Sinn vom Verlust an Legitimität. Die Geschichte der Verfassungen zeigt etwa, daß es Zeiten gab, in denen alte Gesellschaftsformen ihren Kredit und damit ihre Autorität verloren. Wie kann man dieses zentrale Phänomen politischer Geschichte erklären? Wie kann man das Ende der Römischen Republik, des *Ancien Régime*, des Heiligen Römischen Reiches begreifen? Wie enden politischen Institutionen? Die Erfahrungen des 20. Jahrhunderts beinhalten den Kreditverlust und das Ende der mitteleuropäischen Monarchien, des Nationalsozialismus, des Faschismus und des Kommunismus. Ist der politische Liberalismus und die demokratische Legitimation der endgültige Gewinner der Weltgeschichte der staatlichen Verfassungen?

Ein traditioneller Zugang zum Phänomen des Endens ist die Geschichte der Künste. Wie und warum ändern sich Stile? Wieso kommen herrschenden formalen Strukturen in Malerei, Architektur und Musik aus der Mode? Es gab vor ein paar Jahrzehnten die Diskussion um das Ende literarischer Gattungen wie den Roman, das Drama und andere Kunstformen—die dann schließlich doch überlebten. Die Faszination der Veränderung, die immer das „Enden“ einschließt, scheint ein besonderes Merkmal der Selbstinzenierung der Moderne zu sein. Ist dieser Habitus derzeit selbst zu einem Ende gekommen?

Use insert sheet in this issue for paper proposals.

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