been developed more recently into a critical stance which she adopts towards Adorno's and Schoenberg's ideal of the reclusive, score-possessing, structural listener. This listener's approach to music is revealed not only as being based on a particular musical style and education, but also as lacking 'recognition to non-structural varieties of meaning or emotion in the act of listening. . . . Structural listening by itself turns out to be socially divisive.'[14]

This social divisiveness as enacted through music must not be of major concern given the status of music in modern society. It shows itself not only in the dimming lights at the beginning of most concerts, when we retreat into our emotional self to prepare ourselves for the passive 'concert occasion',[15] but also in the difficulty we have in talking about the aesthetic experience of an ever increasing number of musics without losing our identity.

Intellectual History and the History of Philosophy

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Recently, the relation of intellectual history to the history of philosophy seems to be an American concern. I can give two examples. Ten years ago, Richard Rorty wanted the history of philosophy to be written as an intellectual history.[1] Six years ago, Donald Kelley reminded us that intellectual history was nothing more than an offspring of the history of philosophy and that it was never very distant from it.[2] Rorty argues as a philosopher. He speaks of histories of philosophy written by philosophers who tend to think that philosophy 'owns' its proper history. Their histories should be abandoned, says Rorty, since we have enough doxographies or 'histories of the peaks'. Rather, we should write 'nitty-gritty' intellectual histories of philosophy and try to see past philosophies within the context of what they meant to their contemporaries. In this view, philosophers are not merely 'holding' opinions, they are not merely theoreticians, system-builders, or writers, but most of all thinkers who must be understood in the intellectual context of their time and place. Rorty urges us to let go any form of mirroring: the history of philosophy should not look back into past and forgotten ideas, but it should give a historico-critical reconstruction of the intellectual dimension of philosophy.

When Rorty says that the history of philosophy is different from intellectual history, Kelley does not disagree. But he emphasizes the fact that the history of philosophy is always needed for whatever form of intellectual history, because what is central to it, namely intellectual or 'spiritual' life, is everywhere implicitly 'loaded' with philosophy. Being an intellectual historian himself, Kelley hints at the fact that historians of philosophy have been around long before intellectual historians, and that they were the first to give comprehensive descriptions of ideas and notions, of conceptions and world views. In this more historical perspective, intellectual history will always overlap with the history of philosophy: be it only because their interests were originally linked.

Not everybody may think today this overlapping of intellectual history and the history of philosophy still pertinent. And of course it can be argued that even if philosophy was taken in a very wide sense as to embrace all the arts and sciences, it could never really demarcate the open fields of intellectual history. The point is, however, that any interest in intellectual history develops from some disciplinary perspective, e.g. from a philosophical perspective, and that, consequently, it must overcome this perspective in order to include it into the much wider scope—however vague—of intellectual history. In any case, intellectual history should never match any history of any discipline, not even that of philosophy. It should be interdisciplinary and international, holistic and comparative at the same time.

What we can learn from Kelley and Rorty and their demand to change the history of philosophy into an intellectual history, is implicitly enclosed in that demand: it is the fact that the narrowing of the historical perspective takes

[14] 'Toward a Deconstruction of Structural Listening: a Critique of Schoenberg, Adorno and Stravinsky', in *Deconstructive Variations*, 170.

[15] Edward Said, *Musical Elaborations* (London, 1991), 11.

[1] 'The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres', in *Philosophy in History*, ed. R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 49–75.

[2] 'What is Happening to the History of Ideas?', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 51 (1990): 3–25 (reprinted in this issue, pp. 36–50).

place all the time and that the 'discipline-biased' historical reconstruction always imposes itself on any attempt to write intellectual history. Intellectual history seems to be the kind of history which is never quite achieved and which is always critical with regard to established forms of how to envisage the past.

I am not myself sure whether intellectual historians today should keep in mind that what they do developed from the historiography of philosophy, but I do understand very well that intellectual history is directed against conventional forms of the history of philosophy (this is where my own interests lie). I think that the historical reconstruction of philosophy's past times may become important if carried out as an intellectual history, by widening the framework of historical problematization. Rorty tried to do this while criticizing some 'classical' forms of the history of philosophy (doxography, *Geistesgeschichte*, rational and historical reconstruction), whereas Kelley tried to modernize the 'canon' of Arthur O. Lovejoy's 'History of Ideas' (in aiming at general forms of linguistic and cultural self-reflection). What an intellectual history can bring about, both have indicated in many ways which merit to be considered in more detail.

Here I would like to be brief in just adding an illustration of how a disciplinary history changes once approached by an intellectual historian. The disciplinary history in question is of course the history of philosophy, which I know best. In its more conventional forms this history does not consider practices of philosophy teaching. Philosophy is looked at as scientific thinking, as literature, as a way of conducting one's life, etc. Never is there any thought involved of how one reaches the high grounds of philosophical reflection, of how philosophy is cultivated, exercised, and taught, of how one may find a self-understanding as a philosopher. In history books we all know, there is, until today, some concern for different definitions of philosophy at different times, but there is practically no concern for differences in the ways of philosophy teaching—philosophizing as an activity is conceived through 'results', through propositions and systems, taken separately from anything which could be part of their intellectual and social situation. Yet we all know that the book—or, more generally speaking, writing—was never the exclusive expression of philosophy. The schools of the middle ages, the private circles of the humanists, home teaching, and universities in modem times—these are

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forms of transmitting philosophy which tell a lot about philosophy itself; they constitute differences between 'types' of philosophizing which are characteristic of their time. Many philosophers say that thinking is method, but rarely have historians of philosophy tried to address past philosophies accordingly.

Let me be more specific and take for example the nineteenth century, when in German and French universities philosophy was taught as a discipline ('sujet', 'Fach'). Conventional histories of philosophy do not discuss this fact, although ever since, at least in these countries, nobody achieved anything in philosophy without having followed the 'academic' path (this applies also to those who, later on, left this path). What do we in fact know about how universities transmitted the philosophical knowledge? Very little indeed.[3] Worse still: not only do we not know what happened when philosophy was institutionalized by the State (think of France and Germany a hundred and fifty years ago), we also ignore the effects of that institutionalization, although we still witness them today. It was during the nineteenth century that the introduction to philosophy was given more and more by means of teaching its history: it became an academic regularity to introduce the student to philosophy by means of books on the history of philosophy.[4] Conventional histories of philosophy are not only conventional in the sense of usual, they are conventional because they express and support disciplinary and cultural conventions of what it is like to philosophize (just as histories of literature or art express and support disciplinary and cultural conventions of what it is like to be a writer or an artist).

[3] Cf. my articles, 'Philosophy Teaching in Nineteenth-Century Germany', in *History of Universities* XII, ed. Lawrence Brockliss (1993), 197–338; 'L'Historicisation de l'enseignement de la philosophie dans les universités allemandes du XIXe siècle', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 109 (1995): 29–40.

[4] Cf. my 'Bibliography of Nineteenth-Century Histories of Philosophy in German, English, and French', *History of Historiography*, 21 (1992: 141–69.

Only a non-philosophical or not-discipline-biased history of philosophy could explain the 'intellectual' shortcomings of traditional histories of philosophy. There is a need for more than philosophical understanding to write a history of the cultural meaning of philosophy.

Here we have come full circle, since the fact of the conventionality of histories of philosophy can only be explained by means of an intellectual history of philosophy and its teaching practices. If histories of philosophy which are written by philosophers serve—however indirect—teaching purposes, i.e. the 'definition' of philosophy, they are part of the question, what the history of philosophy 'really' is, and not part of the answer to that question. Only a non-philosophical or not-discipline-biased history of philosophy could explain the 'intellectual' shortcomings of traditional histories of philosophy. Of course there is a need for more than just philosophical understanding to write such a history of the cultural meaning of philosophy: so this is no easy job. But principally, we should think of intellectual history as a perspective always taken from one step further back.

Notes on Intellectual History, History of Philosophy, and History of Ideas

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> I wish you saw me half starting out of my chair, with what confidence, as I grasp the elbow of it, I look up—catching the idea, even sometimes before it half way reaches me—I believe in my conscience I intercept many a thought which heaven intended for another man.
>
> (Sterne, *Tristram Shandy*, VIII.2)

I am an historian of ideas, I suppose, even if I am usually rather reluctant to admit it because historians of science and cultural historians—I am surrounded by them—tend to be rather rude about it. History of ideas, they say, is an enterprise which, for all its scholarly pretentions, is inevitably anachronistic in its concern with the ancestry of present-day doctrines, theories and disciplines, and unremittingly intellectualistic in its focus on concepts and contents rather than actions and practices.

In fact history of ideas remains at the heart of all the humanities, and I believe that it is right that it should do so. Of course, certain precautions are in order.

It must be conceded to the critics of traditional history of ideas that, for all their power, ideas have, as it were, no feet. In order to make history of ideas work we must study the concrete ways in which ideas are written up and read, disseminated, received, appropriated. What I have in mind is, in a way, no longer a history of ideas as such, but of ideas in a more material form, ideas as realized in texts—in fact, a history of books in the hands of people reading them, talking about them, and, perhaps, writing about them, borrowing ways of seeing and feeling from them, and even lifting whole pages out of them.

A well-known example is the dissemination of Locke's 'way of ideas': through different editions of the *Essay* and his other writings (with different paginations, different misprints, etc.), through translations, as well as through epitomes and abstracts, reviews in periodicals, dictionaries in different languages, and through essays, mentions (and sometimes travesties) in novels. Some typical questions I should like to ask are: How would an eighteenth-century reader have first got acquainted with the 'way of ideas'? Or, to put it slightly differently, What would have been his/her most probable means of information about it? How would it have appeared to him or her from their reading of standard sources (periodicals, dictionaries, abstracts, etc.)? How much of it would have immediately struck them as interesting, and how much as new? What would they have perceived of, and how would they have talked about, the 'way of ideas' in the different stages of their familiarity with it? and so on. Behind these questions there is another one, crucial: How do we operate in order to identify a plausible eighteenth-century reader? (For instance, quite a few of them are likely to have been women; most of them would have been, and/or made a point of being, amateurs; did they read on their own, or in company?, etc.) It is evident that such an approach would, among other things, end up not only in critical editions, such as the splendid one of the *Essay* by Paul